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Miller v. Johnson: The Supreme Court Eases The
Burden of Proving Racial Gerrymandering
I. INTRODUCTION
The Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments to the United States
Constitution guarantee all Americans in the United States equal protec-
tion under the laws and the right to vote.' Despite the passage of these
amendments, historically, African Americans suffered from wide-
spread discrimination in the voting process.2 Only after the passage of
the Voting Rights Act in 19653 did African Americans begin to see a
substantial increase in their representation in Congress. 4 This change
occurred, in part, because several states racially gerrymandered 5 their
voting districts in an effort to remedy past discrimination.
Recent decisions by the United States Supreme Court, however,
have changed the way states may draw their voting districts.7 The
Supreme Court's hostility toward racially gerrymandered redistricting
plans began with its decision in Shaw v. Reno ("Shaw p,). 8 In Shaw
1. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, §1; U.S. CONST. amend. XV, §1. See infra notes 34-35
for the relevant text of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments.
2. See infra notes 62-82 and accompanying text.
3. Voting Rights Act of 1965, PUB. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437 (codified as amended
at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971, 1973 to 1973bb-1 (1988 & Supp. V 1993)). See infra part II.A-
B.
4. David Morgan, Conservatives Target Seats in Congress, REUTERS, October 21,
1994, available in LEXIS, News Library, Reuter North American News File (noting that
since the Voting Rights Act was enacted, the number of elected black officials
nationwide increased from 300 to almost 8,000).
5. A legislature racially gerrymanders its redistricting plan when it "intentionally
draws one or more districts along racial lines or otherwise intentionally segregates
citizens into voting districts based on their race." Hays v. Louisiana, 839 F. Supp.
1188, 1194 (W.D. La. 1993) (citations omitted), vacated, 114 S. Ct. 2731 (1994), aff'd
sub nom. St. Cyr v. Hays, 115 S. Ct. 687, vacated, 115 S. Ct. 2431 (1995) [hereinafter
Hays I]. See infra note 11.
6. David Broder, Racial Gerrymandering for Congress: Good or Bad?, TIMES-
PICAYUNE, March 28, 1994, at B7 (noting that a racially gerrymandered district in
Louisiana sent the State's first black member in 115 years to Congress, and two districts
in North Carolina elected black congresspersons in that State for the first time since the
Reconstruction).
7. See infra notes 122-33, 212-58 and accompanying text.
8. 113 S. Ct. 2816 (1993) [hereinafter Shaw I].
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I, the Court held that the state created a majority-minority district,
which was so irregular on its face that it could rationally be viewed
only as an effort to segregate races for voting purposes, and that the
state could not offer a sufficiently compelling justification for the
plan.9
After the Shaw I decision, citizens in at least seven states challenged
their legislatures' congressional redistricting plans.'0 In all of these
states, the citizens alleged that the plans constituted unconstitutional
racial gerrymandering" under Shaw J.12 All of the federal courts that
heard and decided the racial gerrymandering challenges relied upon
Shaw I, but their interpretations of that case led to widely divergent
results.' 3 Their inconsistent interpretations led the Supreme Court to
decide to clarify its previous holding.'
4
9. Id. at 2827; see infra part lI.C.2.
10. These states include California, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, North
Carolina, and Texas. See, e.g., Johnson v. Miller, 864 F. Supp. 1354 (S.D. Ga. 1994);
Hays v. Louisiana, 862 F. Supp. 119 (W.D. La. 1994) [hereinafter Hays 111; Shaw v.
Hunt, 861 F. Supp. 408 (E.D.N.C. 1994) [hereinafter Shaw I1]; Vera v. Richards, 861 F.
Supp. 1304 (S.D. Tex. 1994); DeWitt v. Wilson, 856 F. Supp. 1409 (E.D. Cal. 1994),
aff'd in part and appeal dismissed in part, 115 S. Ct. 2637 (1995); Hays i, 839 F. Supp.
at 1188. The cases in Florida and Mississippi are still pending. See generally Morgan,
supra note 4 (discussing the attempts by conservative politicians to get rid of racially
gerrymandered redistricting plans in these seven states).
11. The term gerrymander, named after Massachusetts Governor Elbridge Gerry,
became popular in 1812 after then-governor Gerry approved a bizarre redistricting map
of Essex County, Massachusetts. T. Alexander Aleinikoff & Samuel Issacharoff, Race
and Redistricting: Drawing Constitutional Lines After Shaw v. Reno, 92 MICH. L. REV.
588, 588 n.l (1993). The term refers to distorted districting patterns drawn by
legislators. Id. Initially, legislators gerrymandered voting districts for political rather
than racial reasons. For instance, Patrick Henry attempted to gerrymander a
congressional district in Virginia to prevent the election of James Madison in 1790,
because Henry believed Madison would vote against passage of the Bill of Rights. Id. at
588 n.2. Even today, political parties that hold a majority in state legislatures continue
to gerrymander voting districts to give their party an advantage. The Supreme Court
upheld such tactics as constitutional in Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 136 (1986)
(upholding state plan that disproportionately favored Republicans, but holding that
such plans may violate the Equal Protection Clause if they discriminated against voters
from other political parties or diluted such votes). See supra note 5 for a definition of
racial gerrymandering.
12. See infra part II.C.
13. See infra part ll.D.
14. Miller v. Johnson, 115 S. Ct. 713 (1995); see also Nancy E. Roman, Racially
Drawn Districts' Legality Left to Supreme Court; Recent Rulings Reject Approach,
WASH. TIMES, September 14, 1994, at A4 (noting a recent series of conflicting decisions
by federal panels which have prompted the Court to act).
All cases "challenging the constitutionality of the apportionment of congressional
districts or the apportionment of any statewide legislative body" must be decided by a
three-judge panel at the district court level. 28 U.S.C. § 2284 (1988). A party may
appeal these decisions directly to the Supreme Court. 28 U.S.C. § 1253 (1988).
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The Supreme Court's most recent decision regarding redistricting,
Miller v. Johnson,'5 addressed these inconsistencies. 6 The Miller
case arose after three federal courts struck down portions of congres-
sional redistricting plans that created districts in which black citizens
constituted a majority (hereinafter referred to as majority-minority
districts). 7 These federal courts held that the legislatures impermis-
sibly created the districts to encourage the election of a minority repre-
sentative to Congress.'8
In Miller, the Supreme Court held that parties could prove unconsti-
tutional racial gerrymandering without a threshold showing that the
congressional districts in question were bizarrely shaped.' 9 The Court
determined that the bizarre shape of a district "may be persuasive
circumstantial evidence" of racial gerrymandering. 20 The Court noted
that other evidence of race-based districting on the part of a state,
regardless of the shape of the district, could be used to prove a consti-
tutional violation.2 ' Thus, the Miller decision represents a shift in the
Supreme Court's approach to analyzing redistricting by states, and
greatly affects minority voting rights.22
This Note explores historical interpretations of the Fourteenth
Amendment's Equal Protection Clause, as well as the Voting Rights
Act, and discusses how the courts used them to protect the rights of
both minorities and non-minorities.23 This Note first explains how the
Equal Protection Clause was interpreted to protect voting rights, and
how Congress, in an effort to provide further protection, enacted the
Voting Rights Act.24 Next, this Note examines the conflict created by
state application of both the Voting Rights Act and the Equal Protection
Clause.25 This Note then reviews the Supreme Court's decision in
Shaw v. Reno, and how this decision led to conflicting interpretations
among lower federal courts.26
15. 115 S. Ct. 2475 (1995).
16. See infra notes 212-91 and accompanying text.
17. Johnson v. Miller, 864 F. Supp. 1354, 1393 (S.D. Ga. 1994); Vera v. Richards,
861 F. Supp. 1304, 1345 (S.D. Tex. 1994); Hays II, 862 F. Supp. at 129; Hays 1, 839 F.
Supp. at 1209. See infra part Il.D.
18. Johnson, 864 F. Supp. at 1393; Vera, 861 F. Supp. at 1345; Hays II, 862 F.
Supp. at 129; Hays 1, 839 F. Supp. at 1209. See infra part ll.D.
19. Miller, 115 S. Ct. at 2487.
20. Id. at 2486.
21. Id.
22. See infra notes 351-55 and accompanying text.
23. See infra parts II.A-B.
24. See infra parts II.A-B.
25. See infra part II.C.
26. See infra parts I1.C-D.
1995]
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Within this context, this Note then discusses how the Supreme
Court's decision in Miller changed the way in which states may draw
their voting districts.' This Note discusses the facts of Miller, and the
majority, concurring, and dissenting opinions.2' This Note then ana-
lyzes the issues resolved by the Miller decision, and how this decision
also raised new issues for states to consider when mapping voting
districts. 29 This Note further analyzes the legal correctness of the
Miller decision in relation to the Equal Protection Clause and the
Voting Rights Act.3 0 Next, this Note suggests that the Fourteenth
Amendment's Equal Protection Clause allows states to create districts
that encourage minority representation in government, and argues that
courts should grant states extreme deference and allow states to enact
legislation that attempts to remedy past injustices.3' Finally, this Note
concludes that while the Miller decision could cause a rollback in
minority voting rights, the current split among the Justices suggests
that the issue of the constitutionality of the racial gerrymandering has
yet to be resolved. 2
II. BACKGROUND
A. The Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause Prohibits
Racially Discriminatory Voting Practices
The right to vote is a fundamental civil and political right in the
United States.3 3 More than 100 years ago, the Fifteenth Amendment
extended voting rights to racial minorities? 4 This Amendment, con-
sidered in conjunction with the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment, 5 does not merely guarantee the right to vote;
27. See infra part I11.
28. See infra parts III.A-B.
29. See infra part IV.A.
30. See infra part W.B.
31. See infra part V.
32. See infra parts V-VI.
33. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 561, 568-9 (1964) (striking down a state
legislative redistricting plan as violating the Equal Protection Clause; holding that
voting for representative government is a fundamental right). See infra note 68.
34. The Fifteenth Amendment states in pertinent part: "The right of citizens of the
United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State
on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude." U.S. CONST. amend. XV,
§ 1.
35. The Fourteenth Amendment states in pertinent part: "No State shall ... deny to
any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S. CONST. amend.
XIV, § 1.
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it also protects the right of a citizen to have his or her vote count.3 6
Thus, the Fourteenth Amendment requires that a citizen not only must
be allowed to vote, but also must possess voting power that is ap-
proximately equal to that of other citizens.37
The Supreme Court has held that the central purpose of the Equal
Protection Clause is to "prevent the States from purposefully dis-
criminating between individuals on the basis of race., 3 8 Therefore,
state and local governments are required to treat individuals equally.39
While governments may still classify groups of people in some cir-
cumstances, 40 they may not use impermissible criteria in their classifi-
cations or arbitrarily create such classifications to burden a specific
group of individuals.4' If states disregard these rules, the classifi-
cation constitutes discrimination and violates the Equal Protection
Clause.42
1. The Standard of Review in Equal Protection Cases
The Supreme Court has held that state legislatures retain significant
discretion in deciding what actions are necessary for their citizens, and
will presume the constitutionality of such actions. 43 In equal protec-
tion cases, however, the Court has Abandoned this deferential standard
when a plaintiff proves that the state legislature possessed a racially
36. Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549, 569 (1946) (Black, J., dissenting). See infra
part II.A.2.
37. See Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 560-61 ("[T]he fundamental principle of representative
government in this country is one of equal representation for equal numbers of people..
. .19).
38. Shaw 1, 113 S. Ct. at 2824 (citing Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239
(1976)).
39. RONALD D. ROTUNDA ET. AL, TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: SUBSTANCE AND
PROCEDURE § 18.1 (2d ed. 1992).
40. Id. at § 18.2. See, e.g., United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149, 170-71 (1987)
(ordering state police force to enforce promotion quotas set by court as a result of
judicial finding of past racial discrimination); City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr.,
473 U.S. 432, 439-42 (1985) (offering special treatment for mentally retarded residents
of city); Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 81 (1981) (requiring only men and not
women to register for the United States military draft); Michael M. v. Superior Court of
Sonoma County, 450 U.S. 464, 476 (1981) (criminally sanctioning men, but not
women, for committing statutory rape).
41. ROTUNDA, supra note 39, § 18.2. See, e.g., Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476
U.S. 267 (1986). The Wygant Court overturned an affirmative action scheme because of
insufficient evidence of past racial discrimination, and because the scheme burdened
non-minorities. Id. at 274-76, 280-84. The majority explained, however, that if
sufficient evidence had been introduced, the affirmative action plan might have been
upheld. Id. at 280-81. See infra notes 57-61 and accompanying text.
42. Wygant, 476 U.S. at 283-84.
43. See City of Richmond v. J. A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 500 (1989).
19951
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discriminatory intent or purpose." When a plaintiff shows such
intent, the Court applies "strict scrutiny," requiring the defendant to
show that the legislature "narrowly tailor[ed]" the law to satisfy a
"compelling governmental interest."45
Discriminatory intent can be proven in either of two ways.46 First, a
law may clearly, or on its face, discriminate on the basis of race.
47
Second, a law may appear race-neutral on its face, but in its application
a clear pattern emerges that is "unexplainable on grounds other than
race ... ."41 In the latter situation, the Court has recognized the
discriminatory effect of the legislative action as important
circumstantial evidence of discriminatory intent.4 9 Under either type of
44. Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252,
265-66 (1977). In Arlington Heights, the plaintiff, a nonprofit real estate developer,
alleged that the city violated minorities' equal protection rights by refusing to rezone a
tract of land from a single-family to a multiple-family classification. Id. at 252. The
Court held that the plaintiff failed to prove that racially discriminatory intent or purpose
was a motivating factor in the zoning decision. Id. at 270.
45. See generally Croson, 488 U.S. at 484-85 (discussing the standards the Court will
apply and also citing language in both lower court decisions in this case including J.A.
Croson Co. v. City of Richmond, 779 F.2d 181, 190 (4th Cir. 1985) and also J.A.
Croson Co. v. City of Richmond, 822 F.2d 1355, 1357 (4th Cir. 1987)). This strict
scrutiny test is difficult for the government to overcome; in fact, in past cases, once the
plaintiff proved racially discriminatory intent, the state rarely succeeded in showing that
the use of a racial classification was narrowly tailored to satisfy a compelling
governmental interest. Aleinikoff and Issacharoff, supra note 11, at 592. But see
Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 219 (1944), where the Court upheld the use of
internment camps for persons of Japanese ancestry.
See generally Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 490-92 (1980) (upholding the
constitutionality of federal minority set-aside program, and noting that Congress had a
compelling interest in attempting to end the long history of discrimination); Regents of
the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 284, 320 (1978) (plurality opinion)
(allowing a white plaintiff to challenge university set-aside program); Justice Powell,
who wrote the opinion for the court in Bakke explained that "[r]acial and ethnic
distinctions of any sort are inherently suspect and thus call for the most exacting
judicial examination." 438 U.S. at 291. See supra note 58 and accompanying text. The
Court reiterated this point in Fullilove, where it stated that "[any preference based on
racial or ethnic criteria must necessarily receive a most searching examination to make
sure that it does not conflict with constitutional guarantees." 448 U.S. at 491.
46. See infra notes 47-48 and accompanying text.
47. See, e.g., Croson, 488 U.S. at 477-78 (setting aside city contracts for minority
businesses); Wygant, 476 U.S. at 274-76 (showing preferential treatment to minority
teachers in hiring practices); Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954)
(segregating public school children on the basis of race); Strauder v. West Virginia, 100
U.S. 303, 305 (1879) (banning minorities from serving on juries).
48. Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 266 (holding that the plaintiff failed to show
discriminatory intent on the part of the defendants, and that a showing that the effect of
the law might be discriminatory was not enough to prove discriminatory intent). The
Court noted that circumstantial and direct evidence may be used to determine whether the
legislature possessed a discriminatory purpose. Id. See supra note 44.
49. For example, in Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886), the Court held a
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analysis, however, the plaintiff need prove only that the discriminatory
purpose is one motivating factor in the decision to enact the legislation
in order to trigger strict scrutiny.50
In the first cases interpreting the Equal Protection Clause, the
Supreme Court limited the application of the Clause to state actions that
deprived black citizens of their political rights.5 The Court gradually
extended the scope of the Clause, holding it applicable to school
segregation,52 employment, 53 housing,5' education, 5 and voting.5'
In Regents of the University of California v. Bakke,57 the Court
further extended the scope of the Clause, holding that any racial or
ethnic classification would be subject to a strict scrutiny standard, even
if the racial group being classified comprises a majority of the popu-
lation.58
facially race-neutral city ordinance to be unconstitutional under the Equal Protection
Clause because the plaintiffs showed that the city prosecuted only Chinese immigrants
under the ordinance. Id. at 374. Similarly, in Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339
(1960), a concurring Justice found that a legislative plan redrawing a city's boundaries
violated the Equal Protection Clause because it excluded almost every minority from the
new city limits and altered the city's shape from a square to a twenty-eight sided figure.
Id. at 349 (Whittaker, J., concurring).
50. Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 265-66.
51. See, e.g., In re Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36 (1873), where the Court
limited the scope of the Equal Protection Clause, holding it to be "so clearly a provision
for [the negro] race ... that a strong case would be necessary for the application to any
other." Id. at 81. See also Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 544 (1896), (noting that
the Fourteenth Amendment "could not have been intended to abolish distinctions based
upon color, or to enforce social, as distinguished from political, equality .... "),
overruled by Brown, 347 U.S. at 483; Strauder, 100 U.S. at 306 (stating that the
Fourteenth Amendment's purpose is to secure the negro race with "all the civil rights
that the superior race enjoy.").
52. Brown, 347 U.S. at 493.
53. Croson, 488 U.S. at 500.
54. Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 265.
55. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 320 (plurality opinion).
56. Gomillion, 364 U.S. 339 (Whittaker, J., concurring).
57. 438 U.S. at 265 (plurality opinion).
58. See id at 290-91. The plaintiff in Bakke challenged the constitutionality of a
public university's admissions program. Id. at 277-78 (plurality opinion). The
admissions committee set aside a certain number of positions for minority students. Id.
at 275 (plurality opinion). The plaintiff, who was denied admission to the school,
alleged that he had higher scores than some of the minority students who had been
admitted. Id. at 277 (plurality opinion).
Justice Powell, who wrote the opinion of the Court, based his holding on Fourteenth
Amendment principles. Id. at 320 (plurality opinion). Justice Stevens, joined by three
members of the court, wrote a concurring opinion. Id. at 408 (Stevens, J., concurring).
He concurred in the judgment, but based his decision on statutory grounds, finding that
the preferential admissions program violated Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
42 U.S.C. § 2000d et seq. Id. at 420-21 (Stevens, J., concurring).
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The Court's decision in Bakke made it possible for a white citizen to
bring successfully a suit under the Equal Protection Clause alleging
reverse discrimination.59 Additionally, although Bakke opened the
door for race-based legislation that attempts to remedy the effects of
past discrimination to survive under the strict scrutiny analysis, none-
theless a state may not justify its actions on the basis of general,
societal discrimination. 60 Instead, a state must introduce evidence of
specific, prior discriminatory acts on the part of the state.6'
2. The Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause Protects
Voting Rights
The need for the protections of the Fourteenth Amendment became
clear in the aftermath of the Civil War, when states attempted to deny
voting rights to minorities through various devices such as poll taxes,
literacy tests, and racial gerrymandering of voting districts. 62 Some
states created at-large election schemes that eliminated the potential
voting strength of minorities. 63 Other states gerrymandered districts64
While a a majority of the Court did not decide Bakke on constitutional grounds,
subsequent decisions by the Court rely heavily on Justice Powell's opinion in Bakke as
supporting the doctrine that race-based actions will be subject to strict scrutiny. See,
e.g., Croson, 488 U.S. at 490; U.S. v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149, 167 (1987); Wyant, 476
U.S. at 273.
59. Id. at 289 (stating that "It]he guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment extend to
all persons") (plurality opinion).
The Bakke problem emerged as Congress increased the reach of the Equal Protection
Clause through legislation that encouraged states to enact remedial measures to
compensate minorities for past discriminatory actions. See, e.g., Civil Rights Act of
1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1971 (1988
& Supp. V 1993)); Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (1988 & Supp. V. 1993)). In response, state
and local governments enacted a series of measures that gave minority groups preferen-
tial treatment. As a result, non-minority men and women, who suffered as a result of
such preferential treatment, began arguing that they, too, deserved the guarantees of the
Equal Protection Clause. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 295 (plurality opinion).
60. Wygant, 476 U.S. at 279-81.
61. Croson, 488 U.S. at 493. For example, in Paradise, 480 U.S. at 149, a federal
court found that the State of Alabama repeatedly and blatantly discriminated against
minorities when hiring and promoting state troopers. Id. at 154. The court ordered the
State to use preferential hiring procedures in order to increase the number of minorities
that served as state troopers. Id. The Supreme Court upheld this order, noting that such
action was necessary as a remedial measure in light of clear instances of repeated
discrimination. Id. at 176.
62. See, e.g., South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 310-13 (1966)
(discussing the history of repeated discrimination against black citizens and the use of
voting procedures designed specifically to prevent minorities from exercising their
right to vote).
63. See, e.g., Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613, 616 (1982) (striking down the use of
an at-large electoral system and upholding the lower court's order that the state adopt
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so that minorities were either excluded from important voting
districts65 or scattered among various districts, ensuring they could
never constitute a majority of votes in any district.6
The Supreme Court attempted to remedy these discriminatory
actions by creating principles to govern the mapping of voting dis-
tricts.67 The first principle required equal representation, so that every
voting district in a state contained the same number of citizens, and
citizens had an equal opportunity to participate effectively in the voting
process.68 In addition, redistricting plans that classified citizens on the
single-member districts). At-large voting schemes involve the use of multi-member
voting districts rather than single-member districts. Id. In multi-member districts,
constituents vote for more than one candidate, and all candidates represent the same
district rather than their own individual district. Id. Candidates that receive a majority
of the vote win. Id. As a result, minority groups find it difficult to elect a minority
candidate because they do not make up a majority of the population. Id. This is known
as a dilution of voting power. Id. at 616-17.
The Supreme Court rejected the idea that such districts are per se unconstitutional in
City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 66 (1980). After Congress amended § 2 of the
Voting Rights Act, which effectively overruled the Court's holding in Bolden, the Court
decided Rogers. See infra notes 89-93 (discussing § 2). In Rogers, the Court stated that
courts must examine the use of multi-member districts with stricter scrutiny, and such
districts will be struck down if used with the intent of discriminating against minorities.
458 U.S. at 617. See also White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755, 765 (1973) (upholding the
lower court's disestablishment of multi-member voting district); Whitcomb v. Chavis,
403 U.S. 124, 161-63 (1971) (striking down multi-member legislative districts); Allen
v. State Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S. 544, 571 (1969) (requiring that the state obtain
federal preclearance before changing to at-large election system).
64. See supra note 11 for a definition of the term "gerrymander." See also supra note
5 for a recent judicial definition of the term "racial gerrymander."
65. See, e.g., Wright v. Rockefeller, 376 U.S. 52, 53-56 (1964) (upholding a law
excluding African American and Puerto Rican citizens from one district and placing them
in other districts; districts upheld because plaintiffs offered no proof of intent to
discriminate); Gomillion, 364 U.S. at 340 (striking down a law that altered the
boundaries of a city, which in effect, removed almost all of the city's minority residents
from the city without removing any of the city's white residents).
66. See, e.g., Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 192-95 (1962) (redrawing voting districts
so that minority neighborhoods were scattered throughout other districts, resulting in
dilution of minority voting power). See also Shaw 1, 113 S. Ct. at 2823 (analyzing a
"shoestring" district that packed all of the minorities into one district and thereby
eliminated their voting power statewide) (citations omitted).
67. This mapping process is known as either "redistricting" or "reapportionment."
Shaw I. 861 F. Supp. at 416 n.l. While most courts use these terms interchangeably,
the terms refer to two distinct situations. As one court stated, "'[r]eapportionment'
refers to the reallocation of a finite number of seats in a legislative body among a fixed
number of political subunits. 'Redistricting,' by contrast, refers to the process by
which the lines dividing those political subunits into separate electoral districts are
redrawn in response to a reapportionment." Id.
68. Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 566 ("IT]he Equal Protection Clause guarantees the
opportunity for equal participation by all voters in the election of state legislators.");
Colegrove, 328 U.S. at 569 (Black, J., dissenting) (explaining that equality of
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basis of race were subject to strict scrutiny, identical to previous Four-
teenth Amendment equal protection claims involving racial discrimi-
61
nation.
States continued, however, to use various devices that prevented
black citizens from voting.70 While the Court struck down the use of
many of these devices,1 states created new discriminatory practices
almost as soon as they were forbidden to use the old ones.7 Congress
attempted to remedy this problem through the passage of the Civil
Rights Act.73 State and local governments, however, continued to use
discriminatory voting procedures, and many minority citizens con-
tinued to be denied their right to vote.74
B. The Voting Rights Act
1. Background: State Abuses Lead to Federal Crackdown
In an effort to resolve this ongoing problem of discrimination,
Congress enacted the Voting Rights Act in 1965 to assist in enforcing
the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments to the Constitution. More
specifically, Congress intended to end discriminatory acts on the part
of state and local governments that diminished the voting rights of
representation in the political arena is a fundamental right).
69. Rogers, 458 U.S. at 616-17. See supra notes 44-61 and accompanying text.
70. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 310-12. See supra notes 62-63 and accompanying text.
7 1. See, e.g., Gomillion, 364 U.S. at 340 (holding a racially gerrymandered district
unconstitutional); Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649, 663-66 (1944) (declaring white
primaries unconstitutional); Guinn and Beal v. United States, 238 U.S. 347, 350 (1915)
(invalidating grandfather clauses).
72. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 310-13.
73. The Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. §1971 (1988 & Supp. V 1993)). Later amendments to the Civil
Rights Act granted the Attorney General additional power in these suits in order to end
discriminatory voting practices. Id. § 1971(a)-(c). The amendments allowed the
Attorney General to join states as defendants in the suits and gain access to voting
records. Id. Additionally, the amendments authorized federal courts to register voters in
areas of systematic discrimination and expedited the hearing of voting cases before
three-judge courts. Id. See alsoKatzenbach, 383 U.S. at 313 (noting Congress'
numerous attempts to cope with the problem of voting discrimination via case-by-case
litigation).
74. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 313. In Katzenbach, the Court detailed the problems the
federal government faced in suing individual states over specific voting practices when
the real problem concerned widespread, rampant discrimination among many states. Id.
at 314-15.
75. H.R. REP. No. 439, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1965), reprinted in 1965
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2437. This House Report also suggested that the Voting Rights Act was
intended to assist in enforcing Article I, § 4 of the Constitution. Id.
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minorities.76 The Act proved to be one of the most comprehensive and
successful federal laws in the history of the United States. 77 Yet voti-
ng rights litigation continued to crowd the dockets of federal courts,
and as old issues died with the discriminatory practices that created
them,8 new issues continued to emerge.79
Prior to enactment of the Voting Rights Act, the federal government
experienced serious problems when it attempted to halt discriminatory
practices used by the states.80 Repeated delays in the judicial process
and the acts of state and local officials, who defied or evaded court
orders, or simply enacted new discriminatory laws to replace the for-
bidden legislation, prevented any increase in minority voting power."'
Congress soon realized that using a case-by-case litigation approach
would not solve the problem of voting discrimination.82
Congress aggressively addressed state abuses by enacting the
Voting Rights Act (the "Act"), which contained broad and sweeping
provisions intended to govern almost every area of the voting process,
and to force states to end all discriminatory voting practices.8 3 The
76. See Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 308.
77. See Bernard Grofman, Would Vince Lombardi Have Been Right if He Had Said:
"When it Comes to Redistricting, Race isn't Everything, it's the Only Thing?", 14
CARDOZO L. REV. 1237, 1238 (1993).
78. See supra notes 62-66, 70-72, and accompanying text (discussing voting
practices that were declared illegal).
79. Samuel Issacharoff, Polarized Voting and the Political Process: The
Transformation of Voting Rights Jurisprudence, 90 MICH. L. REV. 1833, 1834 (1992)
(citations omitted). Issacharoff questions the proliferation of voting rights cases:
Gone are the poll taxes, the literacy tests, and the other overt barriers to voter
registration. Gone as well under the impact of one-person, one-vote is the
artificial numerical inflation of the voting strength of one community at the
expense of another. Yet, despite these changes, voting rights claims continue
to mount .... [C]hanges in the substantive law ... [are] clearing the way for
greater judicial supervision of the electoral process.
Id.
80. See supra notes 62-74 and accompanying text.
81. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 314.
82. S. REP. No. 162, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1965), reprinted in 1965 U.S.C.C.A.N.
2544.
83. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 315-16. Despite the Act's strict requirements on state
and local governments and broad grant of federal review of local voting regulations, its
constitutionality has been upheld by the Court as a valid exercise by Congress of its
powers granted by § 2 of the Fifteenth Amendment. See generally Allen v. State Bd. of
Elections, 393 U.S. 544 (1969) (upholding broad use of federal power under § 5);
Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 316 (upholding constitutionality of §§ 4(a)-(d), 5, 6(b), 7, 9,
13(a), and part of § 14). In Katzenbach, the Court noted that the remedies prescribed in
the Voting Rights Act, while stringent, were appropriate means to enforce the Fifteenth
Amendment's prohibition against discriminatory voting practices. Id. at 324. The
Court held that the extensive federal control over state and local voting practices,
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Acts4 prohibited the use of literacy tests, poll taxes, and other discrimi-
natory devices. s5 In addition, the Act 6 offered various remedies and
defined the states to which the Act applied. 87 The Act also forbade
certain governmental units from implementing new voting regulations
without first obtaining approval from federal authorities.'
2. Federal Control Over Changes in State Voting Procedures Under
Sections 2 and 5 of the Voting Rights Act
Modem challenges to state voting procedures occur under sections 2
and 5 of the Voting Rights Act, as well as under the Fourteenth
Amendment.8 9 Section 2 authorizes claims by private citizens against a
state for unlawful vote dilution.' ° Congress extended coverage of the
Act in 1982, adding an important provision to section 2. 9' The new
authorized by the Act, did not unconstitutionally impinge upon the states' own powers
to regulate the election process. Id. at 326.
84. 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (1965).
85. Id. The initial version of § 2 provided that "[nlo voting qualification or pre-
requisite to voting, or standard, practice, or procedure shall be imposed or applied by
any State or political subdivision to deny or abridge the right of any citizen of the
United States to vote on account of race or color." Id.
86. 42 U.S.C. § 1973b (1965).
87. Id.
88. 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (1988); see also 28 C.F.R. § 51 (explaining the procedures for
the administration of § 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, as amended). Section 4(b)
grants the Attorney General the authority to designate an area as a covered jurisdiction
under the Voting Rights Act if a list of factors are met. 42 U.S.C. § 1973c. See infra
note 193 and accompanying text for further explanation of this provision.
89. Grofman, supra note 77, at 1239.
90. See supra note 63 for examples of vote dilution. Such suits are usually brought by
minorities, who allege that their racial group has been scattered among other districts,
so that they do not constitute a majority in any district. See, e.g., Thornburg v.
Gingles, 478 U.S. 30 (1986) (establishing standard of review for voter dilution claims);
United Jewish Org. v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144 (1977) (dividing a community of Hasidic
Jews into two voting districts); Solomon v. Liberty County, 899 F.2d 1012 (11th Cir.
1990), cert. denied, Ill S. Ct. 670 (1991) (challenging the dilution of minority vote by
scattering minorities among various majority-white districts); Garza v. County of Los
Angeles, 756 F. Supp. 1298 (C.D. Cal.), (finding intentional discrimination and
dilution of the Hispanic vote) aff'd, 918 F.2d 763 (9th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, Il S.
Ct. 681 (1991); Jeffers v. Clinton, 730 F. Supp. 196 (E.D. Ark. 1989), (holding that
legislative redistricting plan diluted the minority vote; ordering the creation of black
majority districts), aff'd, 111 S. Ct. 662 (1991).
91. Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-205, 96 Stat. 134
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (1988)). Congress repeatedly amended the
Voting Rights Act. See H.R. No. 91-397, 91st Cong., 2nd Sess. (1970), 1970
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3281, stating that:
the committee concludes that it is essential to continue for an additional 5
years all the foregoing provisions of the act in full force and effect in order to
safeguard the gains in Negro voter registration thus far achieved, and to
prevent future infringements of voting rights based on race or color.
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language provided that federal courts could find a violation of the
Equal Protection Clause if state redistricting plans reduced or diluted a
citizen's voting strength.92 The amendment eliminated the requirement
of discriminatory intent, providing that any voting procedure that has a
discriminatory effect violates section 2 of the Act.9
Under section 5, states can bring suit against the federal govern-
ment. 94 Section 5 requires states to obtain preclearance from the
Attorney General and to prove that their plans do not abridge the
minority vote or dilute minority voting power in violation of section
2.95 In order to help states obtain preclearance, the Attorney General's
office encourages states to "maximize" minority voting power through
the creation of majority-minority districts.96
Id.
92. 42 U.S.C. § 1973. This language codified the principles first enunciated by the
Supreme Court in Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 566 (1964), and Allen v. State Bd. of
Elections, 393 U.S. 544 (1969). The amendment also resulted in the near eradication of
at-large election schemes. See supra notes 37, 63 and accompanying text.
93. Grofman, supra note 77, at 1245. This standard marks a departure from the
purposeful intent standard used by the Supreme Court in most Equal Protection cases. As
a result, "the nature of districting litigation has shifted. Until quite recently, almost all
challenges under the Voting Rights Act were to at-large elections. Now, a very high
proportion of challenges are directed against the way that lines are drawn within a
single-member district plan." Id.
The amendment effectively overruled the Supreme Court's decision in Mobile v.
Bolden, 446 U.S. 55 (1980), where the Court held that § 2 required the plaintiffs to
prove discriminatory purpose, and that proof of discriminatory effect alone was
insufficient to establish a § 2 claim. Grofman, supra note 77, at 1245. See supra note
63.
94. Section 5 requires that covered jurisdictions submit redistricting plans to the
Attorney General for preclearance before they can enforce the plans. 42 U.S.C. § 1973c.
If the Attorney General denies preclearance, states may attempt to obtain a declaratory
judgment granting preclearance from the federal district court for the District of
Columbia, or they may petition that court before requesting preclearance from the
Attorney General. See generally Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156, 168 (1980)
(refusing to allow political unit [city of Rome] of a covered jurisdiction [entire State of
Georgia] to bring independently a declaratory judgment action); Beer v. United States,
425 U.S. 130, 138 (1976) (upholding redistricting plan as valid under § 5 of the Voting
Rights Act, and articulating standard of review for § 5 claims); Georgia v. United States,
411 U.S. 526, 541 (1973) (enjoining State that failed to obtain preclearance from
conducting elections under new redistricting plan).
95. See supra notes 92-93 and accompanying text. Section 5 requirements apply to
"any voting qualification or prerequisite to voting, or standard, practice, or procedure
with respect to voting .... " 42 U.S.C. § 1973c, as amended.
96. Johnson v. Miller, 864 F. Supp. 1354, 1361 (S.D. Ga. 1994); Vera v. Richards,
861 F. Supp. 1304, 1345 (S.D. Tex. 1994). The Johnson court noted the "close
cooperation" between the State and the Attorney General's office during the creation of
the disputed redistricting plan and the preclearance process, and found the strong federal
influence over the state legislature "disturbing." 864 F. Supp. at 1362.
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In a series of cases, the Supreme Court interpreted and further clari-
fied the Act. In Allen v. State Board of Elections,97 for example, the
Court held that the Voting Rights Act covered "any state enactment
which altered the election law of a covered State in even a minor
way." 9 The Court also concluded that private parties had standing to
sue when their state or local government failed to comply with section
5 by enacting and enforcing a new voting law without first obtaining
federal approval. 99 This holding gave citizens an important vehicle
through which they could personally ensure the protection of their
voting rights. The ruling also provided an added check on local
governments, which were now under the scrutiny of both the federal
government and their own citizens.
In addition, in Beer v. United States,'00 the Supreme Court defined
the standard a redistricting plan must satisfy to survive a section 5
review.' O' The Court interpreted the purpose of section 5 as ensuring
that no changes in voting laws be made "that would lead to a retro-
gression in the position of racial minorities with respect to their
effective exercise of the electoral franchise."' 2 The Court found that a
reapportionment plan that enhanced the minority vote would satisfy
section 5 unless it unconstitutionally discriminated on the basis of race
97. 393 U.S. 544 (1969).
98. Id. at 566. In Allen, the States of Mississippi and Virginia passed new laws and
regulations that affected the voting process, but did not attempt to obtain prior approval
under § 5 of the Voting Rights Act. Id. at 544. The plaintiffs brought four separate suits
(three in Mississippi and one in Virginia). Id. at 547. The Mississippi suits were
consolidated on appeal. Id. The general issue was whether jurisdictions covered by § 5
must obtain federal approval of any changes to the voting process. Id. at 549-52. More
specifically, the Allen Court held that a local law creating an at-large voting system for
county officeholders was subject to § 5, whereby the county government must obtain
approval for the new plan before enforcing it. Id. at 569. The Court noted that such a
change could seriously weaken minority voting power:
Voters who are members of a racial minority might well be in the majority in
one district, but in a decided minority in the county as a whole. This type of
change could therefore nullify their ability to elect the candidate of their
choice just as would prohibiting some of them from voting.
Id. The Court concluded that the county must prove to federal authorities that the
proposed change had neither the purpose nor the effect of discriminating against
minority voters. Id. at 570.
99. Id. at 567.
100. 425 U.S. 130 (1976).
101. Id. at 138-41. In Beer, the city of New Orleans requested a declaratory judgment
under § 5 of the Voting Rights Act that a plan reapportioning the city's councilmanic
districts did not violate the Act. Id. at 133. The Court held that the plan satisfied the
requirements of the Act, since it actually increased the possibility that more minority
officials would be elected. Id. at 142.
102. Id. at 141.
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or color.'03 The Beer Court also required, however, that jurisdictions
make an affirmative showing that their plans did not intentionally dilute
minority voting strength.0°  As a result of the Court's interpretation of
the Act, section 5 fulfilled Congress' objective of forcing states to dis-
continue discriminatory voting practices."15
C. Redistricting Under the Voting Rights Act and the Potential
Conflict With the Equal Protection Clause
1. Initial Deference to the Voting Rights Act
Initially, the Supreme Court deferred to the states when analyzing
the creation of majority-minority voting districts. In deciding whether
to approve reapportionment plans, the Attorney General"°6 interpreted
the Beer nondilution requirement as imposing on states an affirmative
duty to maximize minority voting strength and to create majority-
minority districts.'0 7 The Supreme Court implicitly approved such
actions in United Jewish Organizations v. Carey ("UJO").10 8 While
the opinion in UJO was "highly fractured,"" a majority of the Court
upheld the intentional creation or preservation of majority-minority dis-
103. Id.
104. Grofman, supra note 77, at 1239 n.9.
105. See supra note 94. In Georgia v. United States, 411 U.S. 526 (1973), the Court
held that the opinion in Allen "all but conclusively established" that § 5 applied to state
redistricting plans. Id. at 532. The Georgia Court cited congressional approval of the
Allen decision, indicating that the decision accurately interpreted congressional intent.
Id. at 533. Additionally, the Court noted that since Allen was decided, many states,
assuming that redistricting plans were included in § 5 as requiring approval, had
submitted their plans to the Attorney General. Id.
106. See supra note 94 and accompanying text (explaining that states may obtain
preclearance of their redistricting plan from the Attorney General rather than a federal
court).
107. See, e.g., Johnson v. Miller, 864 F. Supp. 1354, 1393 (S.D. Ga. 1994)
(describing the standard articulated by the Department of Justice in evaluating
redistricting plans, and stating that the Attorney General encouraged states to draw
majority black districts). See supra text accompanying note 17 for a definition of
majority-minority districts. See supra notes 89-93 for a discussion of the nondilution
requirement.
108. 430 U.S. 144 (1977). In UJO, a New York redistricting plan required federal
approval because § 5 of the Voting Rights Act covered three counties in New York. Id.
at 148. State officials submitted the plan to the Attorney General, who objected to it
because the plan appeared to dilute the vote of minorities, specifically blacks and Puerto
Ricans. Id. at 149-50. The officials responded to this objection by redrawing the
district lines, whereby the percentage of minority voters in districts where minorities
already constituted a majority increased substantially. Id. at 151. The Attorney General
did not object to the new plan. A group of Hasidic Jews, however, sued, alleging that
their vote had been diluted by the new plan. Id. at 152.
109. Shaw 1, 113 S. Ct. at 2829. See infra part II.C.2.
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tricts, holding that such actions did not violate the Equal Protection
Clause."°
In UJO, the Court held that the legislature did not possess the
requisite discriminatory purpose because the legislature did not intend
to deprive its citizens of the right to vote, or to minimize their voting
strength, on the basis of race."' The UJO Court also relied on Beer in
finding the legislative plan constitutional." 2 The Court interpreted
Beer to allow approval of a reapportionment plan that deliberately
increased the percentage of minority voters in a certain district in order
to comply with section 5.I13
In addition, the UJO Court considered the issue of whether it would
uphold the plan if evidence of a racially discriminatory purpose or
effect existed."4 In doing so, the Court implicitly concluded that even
if the redistricting plan contained discriminatory legislative purposes or
political effects, it could still withstand judicial scrutiny." 5 The Court,
however, required the state to encourage fair representation of all racial
groups when creating the plan." 6 The UJO Court therefore created a
highly deferential standard by which plaintiffs would have difficulty
proving that a state redistricting plan, approved by the Attorney Gen-
eral as consistent with the requirements of the Voting Rights Act,
violated the Fourteenth Amendment."'
1 10. UJO, 430 U.S. at 165 (finding that the plan, by deliberately drawing nonwhite
districts, did not minimize or unfairly cancel out white voting strength, because under
the contested redistricting plan, whites continued to be fairly represented relative to
their share of the population).
I 11. Id. "There is no doubt that . .. the State deliberately used race in a purposeful
manner. But its plan represented no racial slur or stigma with respect to whites or any
other race, and we discern no discrimination violative of the Fourteenth Amendment...
." Id.
112. UJO, 430 U.S. at 160.
113. Id. "Implicit in Beer and City of Richmond, then, is the proposition that the
Constitution does not prevent a State subject to the Voting Rights Act from deliberately
creating or preserving black majorities in particular districts in order to ensure that its
reapportionment plan complies with § 5." Id. at 161.
114. See id. at 167 (comparing the present case to one where a state changes its
voting scheme "for the purpose of increasing minority representation").
115. Id. The Court noted that "we think it would be ... permissible" for a state to
attempt to increase minority voting power, even if it resulted in the "intentional
reduction of white voting power." Id. at 168.
116. Id. at 167. The "plan can be viewed as seeking to alleviate the consequences of
racial voting at the polls and to achieve a fair allocation of political power between
white and nonwhite voters .... ." Id.
117. Id. Such a standard remains consistent with the position of Congress, which in
each amendment of the Voting Rights Act has made clear its goal of strengthening
minority voting rights, and with the position of the Attorney General, who has
repeatedly encouraged the creation of voting districts that increase minority voting
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2. Shaw v. Reno: The Return of Strict Scrutiny
While some commentators consider the Voting Rights Act to be one
of the most important and successful pieces of legislation in the twen-
tieth century,p 8 criticism of the Act has increased dramatically. "9
Critics of the Voting Rights Act cite the liberal allowance of "race-
conscious remedies" in voting rights litigation, 20 which they allege
violate the notion that the Constitution is colorblind.'
2
'
The Supreme Court appeared to agree with these critics in Shaw I,22
when it departed from the liberal standard created in UJO, and returned
to a narrower interpretation of the Voting Rights Act. 23 In a five to
four decision, the Shaw I Court stated that a legislative redistricting
plan containing a district "so extremely irregular on its face that it ra-
tionally can be viewed only as an effort to segregate the races for
power. Grofman, supra note 77, at 1243-44. Grofman noted that "[flew would disagree
with the assertion that the DOJ generally takes a tough line on voting rights, especially
section 5 preclearance, and has done so with reasonable consistency . . . under both
Democratic and Republican presidents." Id. at 1243, n.25. Grofman also found that
"congressional support for strong voting rights enforcement has been so persistent
since 1965." Id. at 1243.
118. Grofman, supra note 77, at 1247.
119. Id. "But there can be little doubt that, since the mid-1980s, there has been a
backlash against the Voting Rights Act." Id.
120. Id. at 1248. See, e.g., Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 42-61 (1986)
(defining standard under which court will determine if redistricting plan dilutes the
minority vote; noting that states must consider race because they must ensure that the
plan does not scatter minorities among majority-white districts, thus diluting minority
voting power); Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613, 616 (1982) (holding that at-large
voting schemes will be subject to the strictest scrutiny, because such schemes tend to
dilute the minority vote, effectively encouraging states to eliminate the use of at-large
voting schemes); UJO, 430 U.S. at 167-68 (permitting the consideration of race when
redrawing the lines of voting districts); South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301,
308 (1966) (affirming the constitutionality of the Voting Rights Act; noting that the
Act was designed to rid the country of discriminatory voting practices).
121. Grofman, supra note 77, at 1248. The concept of a colorblind Constitution first
arose in the case of Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 559 (1896) (Harlan, J.,
dissenting). Later cases, however, show that the court was willing to accept race-
conscious remedies in some cases. See United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149, 185-86
(1987) (affirming court-ordered quota imposed to remedy public employer's past
discrimination); Local 28 of the Sheet Metal Workers' Int'l Ass'n v. EEOC, 478 U.S.
421, 483 (1986) (affirming court-ordered remedy imposed as result of private union's
past discrimination); Wygant, 476 U.S. at 275 (noting that a public employer may
voluntarily use a race-conscious plan to remedy past racial discrimination by that public
employer).
122. 113 S. Ct. 2816 (1993).
123. Nancy E. Roman, supra note 14, at A4. UJO remained good law until the Court
decided Shaw 1. See infra notes 125-33 and accompanying text. In Croson, however,
the Court indicated it would use the strict scrutiny standard when deciding Equal
Protection cases. See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
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purposes of voting" might violate the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.124
In Shaw I, the plaintiffs alleged neither voter dilution nor
deprivation of the right to vote.'25 Rather, the plaintiffs alleged that the
reapportionment plan at issue violated the Fourteenth Amendment
because race-conscious districting "violated their constitutional right to
participate in a 'color-blind' electoral process."'' 26 The district court
dismissed the plaintiffs' claim that North Carolina unconstitutionally
gerrymandered the voting districts. 27
The Supreme Court reversed the district court's decision and held
that the plaintiffs stated a valid cause of action under the Equal Pro-
tection Clause. 28 The Court stated that the bizarrely shaped districts
lacked traditional districting principles and therefore raised an inference
of unconstitutional racial discrimination.'29 The Court compared the
district to "the most egregious racial gerrymanders of the past"' 3 and
classified the district as resulting in "political apartheid."' 3' Addi-
tionally, the Court emphasized that the use of such districts to separate
voters on the basis of race involved a different, "special" type of
injury, which eliminated the need for the plaintiffs to establish vote
124. Shaw 1, 113 S. Ct. at 2824. The Shaw I case arose when the North Carolina
legislature created new congressional voting districts to reflect population increases
indicated in the 1990 census. Id. at 2819-20. Because half the State's counties are
covered by § 5 of the Voting Rights Act, the State submitted its first plan, which
contained only one majority-minority district, to the Attorney General for approval. Id.
at 2820. The Attorney General objected to the plan, noting that the addition of another
majority-minority district would prevent dilution of the minority vote, and that the
drawing of such a district was feasible. Id. In its second plan, which the Attorney
General approved, the legislature added a second majority-minority district, the design
of which generated much controversy. Id. at 2821; Grofman, supra note 77, at 1257.
125. Shaw 1, 113 S. Ct. at 2824. The Court upheld the dismissal of all of the claims
against the federal defendants, but did address the plaintiffs' claim against the State. Id.
at 2823. The Shaw I court concluded that the plaintiffs stated a valid claim under the
Equal Protection Clause. Id. See infra notes 128-33 and accompanying text.
126. Shawl, 113 S. Ctat 2824.
127. Id. at 2822.
128. Id. at 2824.
129. Id. at 2826-27. Such principles include "compactness, contiguity, and respect
for political subdivisions." Id. at 2827. "We emphasize that these criteria are important
not because they are constitutionally required-they are not-but because they are
objective factors that may serve to defeat a claim that a district has been gerrymandered
on racial lines." Id.
130. Id. at 2824.
131. Id. at 2827. Moreover, the Court dismissed arguments that because the plan did
not dilute nonminority voting strength, the plaintiffs did not have standing to
challenge the plan. Id. at 2828. The Court noted that any racial classification can
violate the Constitution, regardless of the racial group benefited by the classifications.
Id. at 2829.
[Vol. 27
Miller v. Johnson
dilution or deprivation.'32 Thus, the Court created a new cause of
action under the Equal Protection Clause, recognizing geographical
oddities in legislative redistricting plans as sufficient evidence of inten-
tional discrimination to prove an equal protection violation.
33
D. Lower Courts' Application of Shaw v. Reno
The Shaw I Court granted the plaintiffs the opportunity to prove an
equal protection violation based on racial gerrymandering. 34 Because
the Court did not decide whether the redistricting plan was consti-
tutional, however, two substantive areas were left open for interpre-
tation by lower courts. 35 The first was whether state legislators could
use any racial criteria in redistricting plans. 136  The second was
whether the Voting Rights Act provided a legitimate justification for
racially gerrymandered redistricting plans. 37
1. Race as a Factor in Redistricting Plans-Evidence Required to
Invoke Strict Scrutiny
Federal courts faced with Shaw I redistricting cases 3 " disagreed
132. Id. at 2828. See infra note 169 and accompanying text. The Court found that
the creation of racially gerrymandered voting districts could violate the Equal Protection
Clause because racial gerrymandering caused "special harms," such as the continued
racial polarization and balkanization of American society. Id. at 2828.
133. Race-Based Districting and Minority Voting Rights, 107 HARV. L. REV. 194,
195 (1993). While the Court relied on the Equal Protection Clause, "its reasoning relied
on appeals to the negative symbolism of race-consciousness rather than on a
demonstration of unequal treatment .... In this way, the Shaw Court used the historical
connection between race-consciousness and racially discriminatory treatment to cast
doubt on the district." Id.
134. See supra notes 122-33 and accompanying text.
135. See e.g., Aleinikoff & Issacharoff, supra note 11, at 602-03. The authors
asserted:
[T]he Court declined the opportunity to announce a clear and decisive norm for
districting cases or to reconsider UJO, choosing instead to focus on the
peculiar shape of the challenged North Carolina district and to arrive at a
decision whose broader implications for the review of state districting
decisions is unclear.
Id.
136. Johnson v. Miller, 864 F. Supp. 1354, 1369 (S.D. Ga. 1994).
137. Shaw 1, 113 S. Ct. at 2831-32. While the Court recognized that a state's desire
to eradicate the effects of past discrimination could constitute a significant state
interest, the Court warned that the state must have a "strong basis in evidence for
concluding that remedial action is necessary." Id. (citations omitted). Additionally, the
Court noted that attempted compliance with the Voting Rights Act would not always
satisfy the compelling interest standard. Id.
138. In these cases, the plaintiffs challenged congressional redistricting plans,
alleging that the plans contained racially gerrymandered districts in violation of the
Equal Protection Clause. See infra notes 143-84 and accompanying text. The Supreme
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significantly on when a legislature's use of race as a redistricting factor
triggered strict scrutiny. Three distinct interpretations of this issue
emerged from the cases following Shaw I. The courts applied strict
scrutiny when: (1) race was a recognizable factor in the legislature's
decision to create a majority-minority district; 39 (2) race was the sole
factor;' 4° or (3) race was a predominant or motivating factor. 4'
Courts adopted polar extremes in interpreting the degree of racial
motivation that would invoke strict scrutiny under Shaw I. Two
courts applied strict scrutiny once the plaintiffs offered evidence show-
ing that race played any role in the legislature's redistricting deci-
sions. 4
2
In the first case, Hays v. Louisiana ("Hays F'), 43 the federal district
court moved beyond the Supreme Court's reasoning in Shaw I by
holding that plaintiffs could prove racial gerrymandering without
showing that legislators created bizarrely shaped districts. 44 The court
explained that the plaintiffs could trigger strict scrutiny through direct
evidence that a state legislature used racial criteria when it enacted the
Court specifically allowed such a claim in Shaw 1, 113 S. Ct. at 2824. See supra notes
122-33 and accompanying text.
139. Shaw I1, 861 F. Supp. at 408; Hays 11, 862 F. Supp. at 119. See infra notes 143-
52 and accompanying text.
140. DeWitt v. Wilson, 856 F. Supp. 1409 (E.D. Cal. 1994). See infra notes 150-52
and accompanying text.
141. Johnson, 864 F. Supp. at 1372 (holding a majority-minority district in
legislative redistricting plan to be unconstitutional); Vera v. Richards, 861 F. Supp.
1304, 1346 (S.D. Tex. 1994) (holding several districts in redistricting plan to be
unconstitutionally racially gerrymandered). See infra notes 154-61 and accompanying
text.
142. Hays H1, 862 F. Supp. at 122; Shaw II, 861 F. Supp. at 429; Hays 1, 839 F. Supp.
at 1188 . Courts interpreting Shaw I to require that race need only be a tangible factor to
invoke stricter scrutiny relied on Fourteenth Amendment decisions predating Shaw 1.
See supra part II.A.l for a discussion of the standard of review enunciated in previous
equal protection cases.
143. 839 F. Supp. 1188 (W.D. La. 1993), vacated, 114 S. Ct. 2731 (1994), aff'd sub
nom. St. Cyr. v. Hays, 115 S. Ct. 687, vacated sub nor. United States v. Hays, 115 S.
Ct. 2431 (1995). In Hays I, the Louisiana legislature enacted a redistricting plan to
accommodate population shifts in the state, as evidenced in the 1990 census. Id. at
1190. The plan created two majority-minority districts. Id. at 1191. A group of
citizens sued, alleging impermissible racial gerrymandering. Id. at 1190-91. The State
argued that since other considerations, such as incumbency protection and partisan
interests, also played a factor in the redistricting process, the plan could not be
considered racial gerrymandering. Id. at 1201. The Hays I court rejected this argument.
Id. at 1201-02.
144. Id. at 1195. After the Hays I court struck down the redistricting plan, the state
created a new plan, which a Louisiana district court, applying Hays I, summarily
rejected. Hays II, 862 F. Supp. at 122. The Supreme Court, on appeal of the Hays II
decision, ordered that the plaintiffs' claim be dismissed due to lack of standing. United
States v. Hays, 115 S. Ct. 2431 (1995) [hereinafter Hays 111].
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redistricting plan. 45 The Hays I court used inferential evidence de-
rived from the bizarrely shaped districts, as well as direct evidence of
legislative intent, to support its finding that the Louisiana legislature
engaged in racial gerrymandering, and that the redistricting plan must
therefore be strictly scrutinized.' 46
In the second case, Shaw v. Hunt ("Shaw IF'),'47 a North Carolina
federal district court similarly held that because race played a role in
creating congressional districts, the North Carolina legislature engaged
in racial gerrymandering. 48 The Shaw II court reasoned that evidence
of use of racial criteria could be proven "by any means," such as
bizarre shape, expert testimony, or state concession. 49
In contrast to the Hays I and Shaw II courts, a federal court in
California ruled the opposite, concluding that Shaw I applied only to a
narrow class of cases. In DeWitt v. Wilson,50 the district court inter-
preted Shaw I to require a stricter standard of scrutiny only when dis-
tricts were so oddly shaped that the legislature clearly considered only
145. Hays 1, 839 F. Supp. at 1195. The court noted that if someone "involved in the
design and passage of a redistricting plan asserts or concedes that design of the plan was
driven by race, then racial gerrymandering may be found without resorting to the
inferential approach approved by the Court in Shaw [1]." Id.
146. Id. at 1199, 1204-05. The court emphasized, however, that evidence that some
of the districts appeared distorted was merely superfluous to its holding. Id. at 1204.
("We need not even consider the indirect or inferential proof approbated in Shaw [I] to
reach the same point-a finding of racial gerrymandering.") The court became the first
in the country to strike down a congressional redistricting plan for creating racial
majority-minority districts in violation of the Equal Protection Clause.
147. 861 F. Supp. 408 (E.D.N.C. 1994), prob. juris. noted, Shaw v. Hunt, 115 S. Ct.
2639 (1995). This case emerged after the Supreme Court reversed and remanded Shaw i,
113 S. Ct. 2816. All of the parties remained the same except that the federal defendants
were dismissed from the case, although on remand the United States submitted amicus
curiae briefs in support of the state defendants. See supra Section II.C.2.
148. Shaw II, 861 F. Supp. at 417.
149. Id. at 431. The court stated:
This 'race-a-motivating-factor' triggering test is necessarily met by proof that
the plan's lines were deliberately drawn so as to create one or more districts in
which a particular racial group is a majority, even if factors other than race are
shown to have played a significant role in the precise location and shape of
those districts.
Id. The Shaw H court departed from the Hays I reasoning in its emphasis on the
importance of the irregular shape of the congressional districts as part of the initial
stage of analysis. Id. The Shaw H court noted that "ugly" districts are important as
"circumstantial evidence that the disproportionate concentration of members of a
particular race in certain districts was something the line-drawers deliberately set about
to accomplish." Id. While the court in Shaw II considered other direct evidence relating
to the legislative intent, it did not specifically rely on those factors in reaching its
conclusion that the legislative plan was racially gerrymandered. Id.
150. 856 F. Supp. 1409 (E.D. Cal. 1994).
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the race of state voters when drawing them.'5 ' The DeWitt court em-
phasized that proof showing the state created a race-based districting
plan would not always establish a racial gerrymandering claim.'5 2
Later decisions rejected the extreme positions advocated by other
federal courts and instead adopted a more moderate evidentiary stan-
dard for proving racial gerrymandering. 5 3 In Johnson v. Miller,5 4
for example, a federal court in Georgia analyzed the two opposing
positions taken by other courts' 5" before deciding that neither position
espoused the correct interpretation of Shaw L'56 The Johnson court
instead determined that in order to state a claim of racial gerry-
mandering, a plaintiff must show that "race was the substantial or
motivating consideration" in creating the redistricting plan.' 57 This
151. Id. at 1412. "Shaw [I] held when districts are drawn in such an extremely
irregular fashion as to be unexplainable, other than being based solely on race, a claim
under the Equal Protection Clause for racial gerrymandering can be stated." Id. The
DeWitt court based its decision on the unique facts of Shaw I-namely, that the
congressional districts at issue had extremely distorted boundaries. Id.
152. Id. at 1413. "Thus, in redistricting, consciousness of race does not give rise to
a claim of racial gerrymandering ...... Id. Cf. Bridgeport Coalition for Fair
Representation v. City of Bridgeport, 26 F.3d 271, 278 (2d Cir. 1994) (applying Shaw I
to a city council redistricting plan, and holding that it did not trigger strict scrutiny
because race was not the city's sole motivation when designing the plan). See infra note
319.
153. Johnson v. Miller, 864 F. Supp. 1354, 1372 (S.D Ga. 1994) (holding that race
must be the "overriding, predominant force determining the lines of the district" to
prove racial gerrymandering); Vera v. Richards, 861 F. Supp. 1304, 1332 (S.D. Tex.
1994) (explaining that race must be a "primary consideration").
154. 864 F. Supp. 1354 (S.D. Ga. 1994).
155. See supra notes 143-152 and accompanying text.
156. Johnson, 864 F. Supp. at 1371-72. The Johnson court first examined the low
evidentiary standard required by Hays I and Shaw IL Id. at 1371 (citing Hays I and Shaw
1I as adopting a lower standard of proof in racial gerrymandering cases). See supra notes
144-49 and accompanying text. The court concluded that these decisions not only
departed from Shaw I and traditional Fourteenth Amendment principles, but also would
lead to an unnecessary increase in litigation, placing state legislatures in an untenable
position. Johnson, 864 F. Supp. at 1371-73. See also id. at 1373 n.22 (citing the
recent Supreme Court case Holder v. Hall, 114 S. Ct. 2581, 2598 (1994), where the
Court noted the recent, disturbing trend of extensive judicial activism in racial
gerrymandering claims). Additionally, the Johnson Court noted that past Supreme Court
cases held that the legislature may always "intentionally consider race in redistricting-
and even alter the occasional line in keeping with that consideration-without incurring
constitutional review." Johnson, 864 F. Supp. at 1373.
The Johnson court also rejected DeWitt's higher evidentiary standard, which granted
state legislatures too much deference in enacting race-based legislation. Johnson, 864
F. Supp. at 1372. The court noted that the Equal Protection Clause "does not require a
plaintiff to prove that the challenged action rested solely on racially discriminatory
purposes." Id. (citing Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S.
252, 265-66 (1977) (citations omitted)).
157. Johnson, 864 F. Supp. at 1354.
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evidentiary standard, the court emphasized, requires proof that race
played the greatest role in deciding where to draw the district lines.'58
In Vera v. Richards,159 a federal court in Texas similarly found that
the plaintiffs must prove that race was a primary factor in creating a
redistricting plan in order to invite more stringent judicial inquiry into
the plan. 60 The Vera court held that the Texas state legislature en-
gaged in racial gerrymandering because its redistricting plan could not
be explained "on grounds other than race.' ' 61
2. The Role of the Voting Rights Act in Providing a Justification for
Using Race as a Factor
Once plaintiffs had successfully proven that a state legislature
racially gerrymandered its congressional redistricting plan, Shaw I in-
structed courts to move to the second prong of analysis and review the
plan with a heightened level of scrutiny.' 2 This strict scrutiny stan-
dard requires that a state offer sufficient justifications to show that it
narrowly tailored its redistricting plan to satisfy a compelling govern-
ment interest.
63
In Shaw I, however, the Supreme Court offered little guidance to
courts when determining what justifications could satisfy this stricter
158. Id. Under such a standard, the plaintiff must prove
that the legislature (a) was consciously influenced by race, and (b) while other
redistricting considerations may also have consciously influenced the district
shape, race was the overriding, predominant force determining the lines of the
district. If race, however deliberately used, was one factor among many of
equal or greater significance to the drafters, the plan is not a racial
gerrymander/racial classification subject to strict scrutiny.
Id.
159. 861 F. Supp. 1304 (S.D. Tex. 1994).
160. Id. at 1342. In creating the plan, the legislature considered several important
factors: the requirements of the Voting Rights Act; the strong interests of incumbent
members of Congress in retaining support in their present districts; and the interests of
political parties in increasing their power base. Id. at 1314, 1316-17.
161. Id. at 1332 (quoting Shaw l, 113 S. Ct. at 2825). The Texas court found that
three congressional districts were racially gerrymandered and noted the "highly
irregular" shape of those districts. Id. at 1345. The court found that the other districts
were not racially gerrymandered, and noted that "[when compared with the other
districts," they were "not highly irregularly shaped." Id. at 1344.
In deciding whether the disputed districts resulted from racial gerrymandering, the Vera
court, as in Johnson, examined other racial gerrymandering cases before rejecting their
analyses and adopting a new one. Id. at 1331-32.
162. Shaw 1, 113 S. Ct. at 2832. For a discussion of the two-step analysis that courts
must apply when examining state actions under the Equal Protection Clause, see supra
notes 43-50 and accompanying text.
163. Shaw 1, 113 S. Ct. at 2832. The plaintiff, however, still retains the ultimate
burden of proving that the legislative plan is not narrowly tailored. Id.
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analysis.' 64 Rather, the Court enunciated two broadly based standards
for lower courts to consider. First, the Court noted that attempted
compliance with the Voting Rights Act does not necessarily constitute
a compelling government interest.' 65 Second, the Court stated that a
racially gerrymandered district will be narrowly tailored only if the
state has a "strong basis in evidence for concluding that remedial action
is necessary."'" The federal courts that applied Shaw I in racial gerry-
mandering cases disagreed in their interpretations of these standards.
The federal district court in Shaw II determined that compliance with
the Voting Rights Act constituted a sufficiently compelling govern-
mental interest, and held that the State of North Carolina was therefore
justified in racially gerrymandering its voting districts.' 67 The court
noted the difficulty in determining what constitutes a compelling
governmental interest in a redistricting case, as courts had, historically,
treated voting rights cases differently from other equal protection
cases. 68 The Shaw II court relied on these precedents, however, as
support for its proposition that both the need to comply with the
Voting Rights Act 6 9 and the need to remedy past discrimination con-
164. Id. at 2831. The Court offered, however, some examples of justifications that
could satisfy this requirement. Id. at 2830. For instance, the Court mentioned that if a
state enacted the redistricting plan to prevent a retrogression of minority voting power,
under Beer v. United States, 425 U.S. 130 (1976), it might meet the stricter standard.
Shaw 1, 113 S. Ct. at 2830. An additional possible justification by a state would be the
desire to avoid dilution of minority voting strength, which the Court defined in
Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30 (1986). Shaw 1, 113 S. Ct. at 2831. The Court
noted, however, that in either situation, the redistricting plan might still be
unconstitutional if the plaintiffs proved that the state did more than Beer or Thornburg
required. Id. at 2830-31.
165. Shaw L, 133 S. Ct. at 2832 (citing Richmond v. Croson, 488 U.S. 469, 500
(1989) (quoting Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 277 (1986))).
166. Id. "[R]ace-based districting, as a response to racially polarized voting, is con-
stitutionally permissible only when the State 'employ[s] sound districting principles,'
and only when the affected racial group's 'residential patterns afford the opportunity of
creating districts in which they will be in the majority."' Id. (citations omitted).
167. Shaw 1I, 861 F. Supp. at 476.
168. Id. The court cited several important differences between the use of racial
preferences in educational admissions (Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S.
265 (1978)); employment (Wygant, 476 U.S. at 267); and government contracts
(Croson, 488 U.S. at 469), from the consideration of race in legislative redistricting
plans. Id. at 423. The Supreme Court recently granted certiorari on this issue. Shaw I!I,
115 S. Ct. 2639. See infra notes 368, 373-76 and accompanying text.
169. The court found such an interest existed in select cases where a state
discriminated against minorities and excluded them from the political process, yet
minority citizens had no recourse under the Voting Rights Act. Shaw II, 861 F. Supp. at
437. Such a situation could occur if minorities were too widely dispersed to constitute a
"geographically compact" majority-minority district, see Thornburg v. Gingles, 478
U.S. 30, 49 (1986), and therefore could not claim voter dilution under § 2 of the Act.
Shaw II, 861 F. Supp. at 444. Additionally, if the area at issue was not a jurisdiction
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stituted sufficiently compelling governmental interests. 70 The court
determined that such interests were even more compelling in voting
rights cases than in other areas governed by equal protection law.171
Other federal courts agreed that compliance with the Voting Rights
Act might constitute a compelling governmental interest.' 72 Their
decisions, however, focused on the fact that the states failed to tailor
narrowly their redistricting plan to comply with such an interest. 7
3
In Hays v. Louisiana ("Hays p,),174 a federal district court disagreed
with Shaw II and held that the State of Louisiana failed to meet the
second prong of the equal protection claim. 75 The court noted that
under Shaw J,176 a racially gerrymandered redistricting plan is
covered by § 5 of the Act, minority voters would otherwise have no recourse against
such discriminatory actions. Id.
170. Shaw II, 861 F. Supp. at 443 (citations omitted). The court mentioned the
importance of encouraging states to voluntarily comply with federal discrimination laws
as a compelling interest. Id. at 437 (citing Wygant, 476 U.S. at 274-77).
171. Id. at 438. "[Tlhe Supreme Court has recognized consistently that the Voting
Rights Act is the single most important piece of federal anti-discrimination legislation
ever passed by Congress ...... Id. The Shaw !I court noted that a state must have a
"strong basis in evidence" for concluding that the creation of the majority-minority
districts is necessary. Id. at 437 (citations omitted). Additionally, the court explained
that the state must identify past discriminatory acts with some particularity before it
may engage in race-based redistricting. Id. at 444 (citing Croson, 488 U.S. at 504). The
state does not, however, need to make an explicit finding of discrimination on the
record, as long as it can demonstrate that it has some evidentiary basis for its actions.
Wygant, 476 U.S. at 289-91 (O'Connor, J., concurring). The court held, however, that
North Carolina had a strong basis for concluding that it must engage in race-based
redistricting in order to comply with the Voting Rights Act because it had information
sufficient to support a prima facie showing that its failure to do so would violate the Act.
Shaw !I, 861 F. Supp. at 474.
Furthermore, the court found that the State's desire to "eradicate the effects of past or
present racial discrimination in its political processes" posed an additional compelling
state interest. Id. at 443. Evidence showed that legislators honestly believed that
justice required adding another majority-minority district in light of the state's
extensive history of discrimination in voting. Id. at 463.
172. In Johnson v. Miller, 864 F. Supp. 1354 (S.D. Ga. 1994), the court rejected the
State of Georgia's argument that it had a compelling state interest in ensuring
proportional representation and eradicating the effects of past discrimination, and the
court concluded that "a compelling state interest in remedying prior discriminatory
voting practices does not exist independent of the Voting Rights Act." Id. at 1380.
In Vera v. Richards, 861 F. Supp. 1304 (S.D. Tex. 1994), the court also acknowledged
that a state might have a compelling interest in enacting remedial legislation that met
the requirements of the Act. Id. at 1333.
173. See, e.g., Johnson, 864 F. Supp. at 1393; Vera, 861 F. Supp. at 1345. See infra
notes 207-11 and accompanying text for a discussion of why these courts believed that
the redistricting plans were not narrowly tailored.
174. 839 F. Supp. 1188 (W.D. La. 1993).
175. Id. at 1209.
176. 113 S. Ct. 2816 (1993).
Loyola University Chicago Law Journal
narrowly tailored only if it is "reasonably necessary" to achieve the
compelling governmental interest. 77 According to the Hays I court, a
plan creating additional majority-minority districts would be rea-
sonably necessary only if a state needed to add a second majority-
minority district to prevent a reduction of minority voting strength.'7 8
In another case, Johnson v. Miller, 79 the court held that while
compliance with the Voting Rights Act might be compelling, the state's
redistricting plan was not "reasonably necessary" to achieve com-
pliance, because it exceeded the requirements of the Act.' s
In Vera v. Richards,8' a third district court explicitly disagreed with
the contention in Shaw ,182 which proposed that a racially gerry-
mandered district lacking traditional notions of districting could still be
found constitutional.8 3 On the contrary, the Vera court used evidence
of oddly-shaped boundaries to support its holding that the legislature
did not narrowly tailor the districts to achieve a compelling interest. 
s4
177. Hays 1, 839 F. Supp. at 1206 (quoting Shaw 1, 113 S. Ct. at 2831 (citations
omitted)). The Hays I court interpreted this requirement as preventing states from
burdening the "fights and interests of its citizens more than is reasonably necessary to
further the compelling governmental interest advanced by the state." Id. at 1206-07.
178. Id. at 1207. The court concluded that such facts did not exist in the present case.
Id. The court assumed for purposes of its analysis that compliance with the Voting
Rights Act constitutes a compelling state interest. Id. The Hays I court held that since
the State clearly did not need to take such action, the redistricting was unconstitutional.
Id.
179. 864 F. Supp. 1354 (S.D. Ga. 1994).
180. Id. at 1393. The Johnson court found only two situations where race-based
redistricting could be narrowly tailored to satisfy either § 5 or § 2 of the Voting Rights
Act. First, if the Attorney General denied § 5 preclearance of a redistricting plan because
it led to a retrogression in minority voting power. Johnson, 864 F. Supp. at 1384
(citing Beer v. United States, 425 U.S. 130, 141 (1976)) (holding that plaintiffs stated a
claim for abridgement of the right to vote because a new enactment led to a retrogression
of plaintiffs' voting power). See also 28 C.F.R. § 51.54(a) (citing Beer, and making
retrogression the standard for finding discriminatory effect under § 5). See supra notes
100-05 for a discussion of Beer and the retrogression standard.
Second, race-based redistricting could be narrowly tailored if minority plaintiffs suing
under § 2 could show the existence of a geographically compact area of minority voters
that legislators ignored when creating such a plan. Johnson, 864 F. Supp. at 1387.
181. 861 F. Supp. 1304 (S.D. Tex. 1994).
182. 861 F. Supp. 408 (E.D.N.C. 1994).
183. Id. at 476. See supra note 180.
184. Vera, 861 F. Supp. at 1304. In Vera, the court struck down District 30 because it
had "no integrity in terms of traditional, neutral redistricting criteria." Id. at 1339. The
court also struck down Districts 18 and 29 "[b]ecause [they] are formed in utter disregard
for traditional redistricting criteria and because their shapes are ultimately unexplainable
on grounds other than racial quotas." Id. at 1341. Lastly, the court upheld District 28,
noting that the district is not "so out of line with traditional districting criteria as to
raise a serious question about racial gerrymandering." Id. at 1344.
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III. DISCUSSION
A. Miller v. Johnson: The United States Supreme Court Expands its
Holding in Shaw v. Reno
In the aftermath of Shaw I, courts split widely when interpreting the
plaintiffs' burden of proof in cases alleging that race-conscious redis-
tricting plans violated the Equal Protection Clause. In particular, the
courts disagreed on the degree of race consciousness that would
trigger strict scrutiny. 85 Additionally, when applying strict scrutiny,
courts differed on what would constitute a compelling governmental
interest, and how a state could narrowly tailor a redistricting plan to
achieve that interest.'6
In Miller v. Johnson, 87 the Supreme Court attempted to answer
these questions and resolve the conflict created by Shaw L In a five to
four decision, the Miller Court held that if the plaintiff could establish,
through either direct or circumstantial evidence, that race was the
predominant factor in the state's creation of a redistricting plan, then
the plan would be subject to strict scrutiny. 8 8 Additionally, the Court
held that a redistricting plan created to comply with the Voting Rights
Act could withstand strict scrutiny, but only where the racially gerry-
mandered districts were reasonably necessary to satisfy the require-
ments of the Act.' 8
9
1. The Facts and the Lower Court's Opinion
The Miller case arose because the State of Georgia added a majority-
minority voting district in an effort to comply with the Voting Rights
Act. Between 1980 and 1990, the State contained ten congressional
districts; a majority of the voters were black in one of these districts."9
The 1990 census revealed that the State's population had increased,
entitling the State to an additional eleventh congressional seat, and
185. See supra notes 138-61 and accompanying text.
186. See supra notes 162-84 and accompanying text.
187. 115 S. Ct. 2475 (1995).
188. Id. at 2488, 2490. See infra notes 233-38 and accompanying text.
189. Id. at 2491.
190. Id. at 2483. In Busbee v. Smith, 549 F. Supp. 494 (D.D.C. 1982), aff'd, 459
U.S. 1166 (1983), the United States District Court for the District of Columbia held that
the first plan submitted by the Georgia legislature violated § 5 of the Voting Rights Act,
42 U.S.C. § 1973c (1988). Id. at 517. The court held that the plan, which fragmented
the black community in one area of the state, "implemented a scheme designed to
minimize black voting strength to the extent possible." Id. at 518. Georgia's
legislature subsequently submitted a plan that repaired the fragmentation, which the
district court approved. Id. at 520.
1995]
Loyola University Chicago Law Journal
requiring the State legislature to devise a redistricting plan to accom-
modate the new district.' 9' Since the United States Attorney General
had previously designated Georgia a covered jurisdiction under section
4(b) of the Voting Rights Act,' 92 the State legislature had to obtain
federal preclearance before enacting a new redistricting plan.'93
The first two plans submitted by Georgia's General Assembly con-
tained two majority-minority districts. The Justice Department, how-
ever, denied preclearance of both plans, noting that the plans did not
fully recognize the State's black population, and suggesting that the
legislature create a third majority-minority district.' The legislature
subsequently created a new plan containing another majority-minority
district, known as the Eleventh District, which the Justice Department
approved. 95
After the 1992 elections were held under the new plan,'9 five white
voters from the Eleventh District sued various State officials alleging
that the State legislature racially gerrymandered the legislative redis-
tricting plan in violation of the Equal Protection Clause.' 97 In those
elections, black candidates from all three majority-minority districts
were elected to Congress.198 As proof of racial gerrymandering, the
plaintiffs cited the shape of the Eleventh District, which they alleged
was bizarre. 99 Additionally, the plaintiffs submitted statements made
191. Miller, 115 S. Ct. at 2483. The census also revealed that 27% of the state's
population was black. Id.
192. 42 U.S.C. § 1973b(b) (1988). See also 30 Fed. Reg. 9897 (1965); 28 C.F.R. §
51 (1993). Section 4(b) grants the Attorney General the authority to designate an area
as a covered jurisdiction under the Voting Rights Act if a list of factors are met. See
supra note 88 and accompanying text for an explanation of this provision.
193. Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (1988), requires that
jurisdictions designated under § 4(b) of the Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1973b(b), must obtain
preclearance before enacting any changes in a "standard, practice, or procedure with
respect to voting." 42 U.S.C. § 1973c. A state may obtain preclearance by submitting
the proposed change to the Attorney General or to the United States District Court for
the District of Columbia. Id. See supra note 94 and accompanying text for a complete
explanation of this provision.
194. Miller, 115 S. Ct. at 2483-84. The Justice Department relied on several
alternative plans, each of which contained three majority-minority districts, in making
its decision to deny preclearance. Id. at 2484.
195. Id.
196. Id. at 2485. The United States also "intervened in support of the defendant" in
the case. Id.
197. Id. at 2485. See Shaw 1, 113 S. Ct. 2816 (holding that plaintiffs could state an
equal protection claim for racial gerrymandering). See supra note 50.
198. Johnson, 864 F. Supp. at 1369.
199. Id. at 1378. The plaintiffs noted that the district stretched 260 miles, from
metropolitan Atlanta in the northern portion of the State, to rural towns in central
Georgia, to Savannah in the south. Id. at 1376. The district split the city of Savannah,
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by members of the Justice Department, who had encouraged the State
to submit a redistricting plan that contained a third majority-minority
district.200
A three-judge federal panel declared the Georgia redistricting plan an
unconstitutional racial gerrymander.20' The court interpreted the
Supreme Court's decision in Shaw I" as holding that in order to state
a claim of racial gerrymandering, a plaintiff must show that "race was
the substantial or motivating consideration" in creating the redistricting
plan.20 3 This evidentiary standard, the court emphasized, requires
proof that race played the greatest role in deciding where to draw the
district lines.2°
Furthermore, the district court determined that proof of racial gerry-
mander could be found not only by the bizarre shape of the congres-
sional district, but also by other evidence of legislative intent to create
districts on the basis of race.20 5 The court concluded that the Georgia
plan was racially gerrymandered. 2°6
After determining that the legislature engaged in racial gerry-
mandering, the lower court then turned to the strict scrutiny prong of
its analysis, examining whether the gerrymandering was narrowly
tailored to satisfy a compelling governmental interest.207 Even though
it found compliance with the Voting Rights Act a potentially com-
pelling interest, 2°8 the court determined that the state did not narrowly
and the entire redistricting plan split twenty-six counties. Id. at 1367.
200. Id. at 1377. See infra note 210 and accompanying text.
201. Johnson, 864 F. Supp. at 1393.
202. 113 S. Ct. 2816 (1993).
203. Johnson, 864 F. Supp. at 1372. See supra notes 154-58 and accompanying
text.
204. Johnson, 864 F. Supp. at 1372. Under such a standard, the plaintiff must prove
that the legislature (a) was consciously influenced by race, and (b) while other
redistricting considerations may also have consciously influenced the district
shape, race was the overriding, predominant force determining the lines of the
district. If race, however deliberately used, was one factor among many of
equal or greater significance to the drafters, the plan is not a racial
gerrymander/racial classification subject to strict scrutiny.
Id. See supra notes 154-58 and accompanying text.
205. Johnson, 864 F. Supp. at 1374 (quoting Shaw II, 861 F. Supp. at 431. for the
assertion that proof can be made "by any means, including state concession, bizarre
shape, or some combination of the various factors typically used to prove the 'intent'
element of an Equal Protection claim ....").
206. Id. at 1378. The court noted the bizarre shape of the Eleventh District. Id. at
1367. The court also cited statements by various state officials, who acknowledged that
they purposefully created the Eleventh District to contain a significant majority-black
population. Id. at 1361-68, 1378.
207. Id. at 1383. See supra notes 179-80 and accompanying text.
208. Johnson, 864 F. Supp. at 1381. In fact, the court stated that "in scenarios
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tailor the plan to achieve'this goal because the plan exceeded the retro-
gression requirements of the Voting Rights Act.2 9 The court found
that the Attorney General should have precleared Georgia's initial re-
districting plan, rather than force the State to add a third majority-
minority district.2'° Because the State could not rebut the plaintiffs
evidence that the plan was not narrowly tailored, the court held, the
plan must be struck down as unconstitutional.2 '
2. The Majority Opinion
In Miller v. Johnson,22 the Supreme Court clarified and expanded
its holding in Shaw v. Reno ("Shaw n,). 2 3 The Miller Court affirmed
the opinion of the lower court, holding that the Georgia legislature
racially gerrymandered its redistricting plan in violation of the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.214
The majority21' began its analysis by defining how a plaintiff can
prove racial gerrymandering, thus subjecting a redistricting plan to216
strict scrutiny by the court. The defendants in Miller argued that
Shaw I required the plaintiff to demonstrate that the shape of the
Eleventh District was so bizarre that it could not be explained on
grounds other than race, and that the plaintiff failed to do so.2" 7
involving jurisdictions subject to § 5, a compelling interest is initially assumed, since
the plans in question could not have been enacted without VRA 'compliance' as
interpreted by the Justice Department." Id. at 1382.
209. Id. at 1384. See supra notes 153-58, 179-80 and accompanying text for a
complete discussion of the court's rationale.
210. Johnson, 864 F. Supp. at 1384. The Johnson court severely criticized the
actions of the Department of Justice ("DOJ") throughout its opinion, finding that the
DOJ exceeded its authority in forcing the state to add another district to satisfy § 5
preclearance requirements. Id. at 1367-68. The court conceded that it had no power to
review the actions of the DOJ (under the Voting Rights Act, only the District Court for
the District of Columbia has jurisdiction over cases against the DOJ pursuant to 42
U.S.C. 19731(b) (1988)). Id. at 1383 n.32. The court implied, however, that by striking
down districts approved by the DOJ, it would be sending a message that the DOJ's
interpretation of the Voting Rights Act was unconstitutional. Id. at 1383.
211. Id. at 1393 (prohibiting congressional elections in the racially gerrymandered
district until the court revised the redistricting plan).
212. 115 S. Ct. 2475 (1995).
213. 113 S. Ct. 2816 (1993).
214. Miller, 115 S. Ct. at 2494.
215. Justice Kennedy wrote the majority opinion, in which Chief Justice Rehnquist,
and Justices O'Connor, Scalia, and Thomas joined. Id. at 2482.
216. Id. at 2485-87.
217. See Brief for Appellants at *24, Miller, 115 S. Ct. 2475 (1995) (No. 94-631),
1995 WL 89323 (arguing that "the highly irregular, bizarre character of a district is an
essential element of a Shaw I claim. Without it, not even a prima facie equal protection
claim can be made out."). The State defendants also asserted that a "'bizarre,' 'extremely
irregular' configuration is not a mere item of circumstantial evidence. It is a critical
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Further, the defendants asserted that evidence of legislative intent alone
could not state a Shaw I claim of racial gerrymandering."'
The Miller Court rejected these arguments. The Court stated that
Shaw I requires that when a state legislative plan evidences the use of
"race as a basis for separating voters into districts," that plan will be
subject to strict scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause.2 9 The
Court noted that just as a state cannot, "absent extraordinary
justification, segregate citizens on the basis of race" in other areas of
society, a state also cannot segregate citizens on the basis of race when
drawing voting districts.220
Specifically, the Miller Court noted that in order to prove racial
gerrymandering of a voting district, thereby subjecting it to strict
scrutiny, the plaintiff did not have to prove that the district was
"bizarre on its face." 22' The Court explained that a bizarrely shaped
district provided powerful circumstantial evidence of race-based dis-
tricting, but other evidence could also prove a potential constitutional
violation.222
In formulating this rule, the majority applied principles articulated in
previous equal protection cases.223 Those cases applied strict scrutiny
element of the cause of action itself." Id. at *25.
218. See Brief for the United States at *17, Miller, 115 S. Ct. 2475 (1995) (Nos. 94-
929, 94-361, 94-797), 1995 WL 89331 [hereinafter Brief for the United States]. The
federal defendant ("Defendant") contested the lower court's holding on this issue for
several reasons. For example, Defendant argued that state legislatures necessarily
considered race when drawing district lines in order to ensure compliance with the
Voting Rights Act. Id. at *21. With regard to certain districts, this consideration may
at times be "overriding" or "predominant." Id. Application of the lower court's holding,
Defendant argued, would result in a redistricting plan being subject to strict scrutiny
every time a state attempted to comply with federal law. Id.
Moreover, the Defendant asserted that the lower court's holding would prove
unworkable. Id. In general, the Defendant noted, it is "difficult or impossible for any
court to determine the 'sole' or 'dominant' motivation" of a diverse group of legislators
when they enact a new law. Id. (quoting Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217, 225
(1971)). This determination becomes even more difficult in cases involving
redistricting plans, where legislators attempt to achieve a variety of purposes and goals.
Id. at *21-*22.
219. Miller, 115 S. Ct. at 2485-86.
220. Id. at 2486. The Court analogized a Shaw I claim to previous equal protection
cases, where the Supreme Court held that the segregation of citizens on the basis of race
in public parks, buses, beaches, golf courses, and schools was unconstitutional. Id.
(citations omitted).
221. Id. The Court explained that it did not intend in Shaw I to suggest that the mere
appearance of a district, along with evidence of the district's demographics, could "give
rise to an equal protection claim," or that the bizarre shape of a district was a threshold
requirement for an equal protection claim. Id.
222. Id.
223. Id. at 2487 (noting that the principles enunciated in Shaw I have repeatedly
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in two circumstances: first, if the government action was expressly
race-based, or "unexplainable on grounds other than race;v22 4 and
second, if the action appeared to be race-neutral on its face, but other
evidence proved that the action was motivated by racist intent.225 In
Miller, the Court analogized evidence of a bizarrely shaped district to
those cases involving express racial classifications.226 The Court
stated if a legislative plan is "so highly irregular," then an intent to use
race-based factors can be inferred. 7 In cases where a legislative
redistricting2lan is not irregular on its face, and therefore appears
race-neutral, the Court explained, the plaintiff may still prove racial
motivations by other means.229
Before determining whether the plaintiff in Miller offered sufficient
proof of racial gerrymandering, the Court emphasized its hesitancy in
reviewing redistricting legislation, which, in a federalist system, re-
mains an exclusive state function. 23' The Court acknowledged that a
state must examine a variety of factors when drawing district lines, and
that a state will necessarily consider racial and other demographics
during the redistricting process.23 ' The Court explained, however,
that while a state may "be aware of racial considerations," a state can-
not be "motivated by them. ', 2
Despite these reservations, the Miller Court concluded that in order
to trigger strict scrutiny of a legislative redistricting plan, the plaintiff
must show that "race was the predominant factor motivating the legis-
lature's decision to place a significant number of voters within or
been applied to equal protection cases "outside the districting context") (citing Shaw 1,
113 S. Ct. at 2825).
224. Id. (quoting Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S.
252, 270 (1977) (holding that city's refusal to rezone a tract of land did not constitute
racial discrimination in violation of the Equal Protection Clause)). See supra notes 47,
50, and accompanying text.
225. Miller, 115 S. Ct. at 2487 (citing Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886)
(holding that a laundry permit ordinance, as enforced, discriminated against Chinese
residents)); Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960) (concluding that redrawing of
municipal boundaries was designed to exclude black citizens from the city). See supra
notes 48-50 and accompanying text.
226. Miller, 115 S. Ct. at 2487.
227. Id. (quoting Shaw 1, 113 S. Ct. at 2826).
228. Id. (citing Shaw 1, 113 S. Ct. at 2826).
229. Id. The Court acknowledged, however, that in such case, proof of race-based
redistricting will be more difficult. Id. (citing Shaw 1, 113 S. Ct. at 2826).
230. ld.. at 2488. "It is well settled that 'reapportionment is primarily the duty and
responsibility of the State."' Id. (citations omitted).
231. Id.
232. Id.
[Vol. 27
Miller v. Johnson
without a particular district." '233 The majority stated that the plaintiff
could meet this burden through circumstantial evidence of the bizarre
shape of a district, along with demographics showing the separation of
citizens by race, or through direct evidence of the legislature's
purpose.234
Turning to the facts of the case, the Miller Court affirmed the lower
court's holding that the plaintiffs met their burden of proving racial
gerrymandering, and that the Court must therefore examine the
legislative redistricting plan with strict scrutiny.235 The Court noted
the existence of circumstantial evidence of the odd shape of the district,
and accompanying demographics showing the racial composition of
the district.236 Additionally, the Court cited extensive direct evidence
of the Justice Department's insistence that the legislature create a third
majority-black district. 237 The Court concluded that this evidence
supported the district court's holding that race was the overriding
factor in the creation of the Eleventh District.238
The majority then turned to an examination of whether the redis-
tricting plan was narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling govern-
mental interest. The defendants argued that the State of Georgia con-
sidered race when drawing the congressional districts only to comply
with sections 2 and 5 of the Voting Rights Act.239 The defendants
asserted that not only did attempting to comply with the Act constitute
a compelling state interest, but also that the creation of three majority-
minority districts was narrowly tailored to achieve compliance.240
233. Id.
234. Id. The Court explained that in order to make such a showing, the "plaintiff
must prove that the legislature subordinated traditional race-neutral districting
principles, including but not limited to compactness, contiguity, respect for political
subdivisions or communities defined by actual shared interests, to racial
considerations." Id.
235. Id.
236. Id. at 2489. The Court noted that in comparison with other districts in this
country, the shape of the Eleventh District alone "may not seem bizarre on its face."
The Court stated, however, that the district's shape, when considered along with the
racial and population densities of the district, provided "compelling" evidence. Id. See
supra notes 221-22 and accompanying text.
237. Miller, 115 S. Ct. at 2489.
238. Id.
239. Id. at 2491; 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973, 1973c. See supra notes 75-105 for a complete
discussion of the Voting Rights Act.
240. Brief for the United States, supra note 218, at *28. The defendants stated that in
order to rely on the Voting Rights Act as a justification, the State must show that there
existed a "'strong basis in evidence' for the State's actions." Id. Further, the defendants
argued that the State could satisfy this requirement if a sound basis existed for believing
that failure to draw the third majority-minority district would lead to "a prima facie case
against it" under the Voting Rights Act. Id. at *28-*29 (citations omitted). The
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The Miller Court rejected the defendants' arguments. The Court ac-
knowledged that the State legislature created the third majority-
minority district solely to comply with the Justice Department's pre-
clearance requirements under section 5 of the Voting Rights Act.2 4'
The Court explained, however, that regardless of whether compliance
with the Act alone might constitute a compelling interest,242 the State
must show that the creation of the Eleventh District was "reasonably
necessary" to satisfy the Act.243
In the present case, the Court held that the State could not prove that
a reasonable basis existed to believe that its two previously proposed
redistricting plans violated the Act.2 " The Court determined that the
Justice Department misinterpreted the requirements of section 5 when
it required the State to draw a third majority-minority district.245 The
Court noted that these plans increased the number of majority-black
districts in the State from one to two.246  Therefore, the Court ex-
plained, these earlier plans prevented retrogression and, as such, fully
complied with section 5.24 The Court concluded that because the
State's creation of the Eleventh District exceeded the requirements of
the Voting Rights Act, the State could not prove that it narrowly tai-
lored its actions to comply with the Act.2"
The Miller Court also rejected the defendants' argument that they
acted reasonably in relying on the Justice Department's interpretation
defendants alleged that since the Attorney General refused to preclear the redistricting
plan under § 5 unless the State added a third majority-minority district, the State had a
strong basis for believing that the plan violated § 5. Id. at *31. Additionally, given the
history of discrimination and racially polarized voting in the State, the State also had a
sound basis for believing that the plan violated § 2. Id. at *36-*38.
241. Miller, 115 S. Ct. at 2490. The Court stated that a compelling state interest
existed when a state attempted to "eradicat[e] the effects of past racial discrimination."
id. (citing Shaw 1, 113 S. Ct. 2816, 2831 (1993)). In this case, however, the defendants
did not argue "that it created the Eleventh District to remedy past discriminator[y] acts."
Id. at 2490.
242. Id. at 2490-91. The Court did not discuss whether compliance with the Voting
Rights Act provided a compelling interest "independent of any interest in remedying
past discrimination." Id.
243. Id. at 2491. "As we suggested in Shaw [11, compliance with federal
antidiscrimination laws cannot justify race-based districting where the challenged
district was not reasonably necessary under a constitutional reading and application of
those laws." Id. (citing Shaw 1, 113 S. Ct. at 2830-31).
244. Id. at 2492.
245. Id.
246. Id.
247. Id.; see Beer v. United States, 425 U.S. 130, 141 (1976) (holding that a
redistricting plan did not violate § 5 unless it led to a retrogression in the voting power
of racial minorities). See supra notes 100-05 and accompanying text.
248. Miller, 115 S. Ct. at 2493.
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of the Voting Rights Act.249 While courts normally defer to the Justice
Department's interpretation of federal laws,250 the Miller Court stated
that it could not accord any such deference in cases where the inter-
pretation results in a potential constitutional violation. 25' The Court
determined that the Justice Department exceeded the authority granted
to it under section 5.2S2 The Georgia legislature's reliance on this au-
thority therefore could not satisfy the strict scrutiny analysis, and the
Court struck down the redistricting plan.253
3. Justice O'Connor's Concurring Opinion
Justice O'Connor cast the deciding vote in joining the Court's
opinion, and wrote a concurring opinion clarifying her interpretation of
the new standard adopted by the majority.5 4 Justice O'Connor stated
her belief that the standard of proof necessary to invoke strict scrutiny
should be "a demanding one" to be applied only to "extreme instances
of gerrymandering. ' ' 25" Specifically, Justice O'Connor interpreted the
majority opinion to require that the plaintiff prove the State relied on
racial considerations "in substantial disregard of customary and tra-
ditional districting practices.
Importantly, Justice O'Connor emphasized that such a standard
should apply to any claim of racial gerrymandering, regardless of the
race of the parties bringing the action.257 She explained that the
standard articulated by the majority should not "treat efforts to create
249. See Brief for the United States, supra note 218, at *29-*30 (arguing that a state
should be allowed to assume that the Attorney General's objection, unless "clearly
unsupportable," to the redistricting plan was correct, given her important role in the
statutory scheme of the Voting Rights Act).
250. Miller, 115 S. Ct. at 2491 (citing Presley v. Etowah County Comm'n, 502 U.S.
491, 508-09 (1992)).
25 1. Id. (citation omitted). The Court noted that such deference was especially
unwarranted in cases involving racial classifications, stating that "we would be
surrendering to the Executive Branch our role in enforcing the constitutional limits on
race-based official action." Id. Further, the Court cited a series of cases holding that in
this country's system of separation of powers, the federal judiciary alone retains the role
of interpreting the Constitution. Id.
252. Id. at 2493.
253. Id. at 2492.
254. Id. at 2497 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Justice O'Connor also wrote the
majority opinion in Shaw v. Reno, 113 S. Ct. 2816 (1993).
255. Miller, 115 S. Ct. at 2497 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
256. Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring). According to Justice O'Connor, the high
threshold at which strict scrutiny begins means that the constitutionality of most of the
existing congressional districts should not be in doubt, even if race played a role in the
redistricting process. Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring).
257. Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring).
1995]
Loyola University Chicago Law Journal [Vol. 27
majority-minority districts less favorably than similar efforts on behalf
of other groups.
258
B. The Dissenting Opinions
1. Justice Stevens's Opinion
Justice Stevens joined the dissenting opinion of Justice Ginsburg,
and separately dissented to clarify his principal disagreement with the
majority's holding. 9 Justice Stevens argued that the plaintiffs in
Miller lacked standing to bring a claim for racial gerrymandering
because they did not suffer a legally cognizable injury. 26°
Stevens reiterated his disagreement with the majority holding in
Shaw 1,261 but concluded that even if Shaw I was correctly decided,
the plaintiffs in Miller did not suffer the injury attributed to them by the
majority.262 He interpreted the majority opinion to hold that the
plaintiffs' placement in the Eleventh District resulted in "represen-
tational harms. 263 He argued that the finding of such a harm to the
plaintiffs actually offered support for the societal misconception that
the majority professed to loathe: members of a specific race will vote
for a candidate of their own race. 264
258. Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring).
259. Id. at 2497 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
260. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
261. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens wrote a dissenting opinion in
Shaw 1, 113 S. Ct. at 2843 (Stevens, J., dissenting). In that opinion, he stated that a
legislative plan violated the Equal Protection Clause only when the plan evidences a
purpose "to enhance the power of the group in control of the districting process at the
expense of any minority group." Id. at 2844 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Additionally,
Justice Stevens expressed the belief that it should be constitutionally permissible to
draw district lines that benefit racial minorities "whose history in the United States gave
birth to the Equal Protection Clause." Id. at 2844-45 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
262. Miller, 115 S. Ct. at 2497 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
263. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Hays III, 115 S. Ct. at 2436). In Hays III,
a group of voters sued the State of Louisiana for racially gerrymandering its redistricting
plan in violation of the Equal Protection Clause. Id. at 2434. A three-judge federal panel
declared the plan unconstitutional. See supra notes 143-46 and accompanying text. On
appeal, the Supreme Court reversed, holding that the plaintiffs lacked standing to
challenge the redistricting plan. Hays III, 115 S. Ct. at 2437. The Court found that the
plaintiffs, none of whom lived in an allegedly racially gerrymandered district, could not
prove that they had been injured by the redistricting plan. Id. The Court therefore
vacated the lower court's judgment and remanded with instructions to dismiss the
complaint. Id.
264. Miller, 115 S. Ct. at 2498 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Shaw 1, 113 S. Ct.
at 2827 (defining the harm suffered as "reinforc[ing] the perception that members of the
same racial group ... think alike, share the same political interests, and will prefer the
same candidates at the polls.")). Justice Stevens reached this conclusion by finding that
the plaintiffs could be harmed only "if all or most of the black voters [in their district]
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Additionally, Justice Stevens noted that even if the plaintiffs were
harmed by the racially gerrymandered districts, a statutory claim
already existed to redress that harm. He explained that if these districts
prevented white voters such as the plaintiffs from electing a candidate
of their own race, then the plaintiffs could assert a violation under sec-
tion 2 of the Voting Rights Act.265
Finally, Justice Stevens indicated his disagreement with the Court's
comparison of the present case to previous cases involving desegre-
gation of minorities or redistricting plans designed to reduce minority
voting power.266 He found such analogies disturbing, and expressed
his belief that in cases such as Miller, where legislation benefits a
"politically weak group," no equal protection violation exists.267
2. Justice Ginsburg's Opinion
Justice Ginsburg criticized the majority for needlessly expanding the
Court's previous holding in Shaw L 268 She noted that voting districts
would now be subject to strict scrutiny not only when legislatures
abandoned traditional districting principles to create bizarrely shaped
districts, but also when those principles were "'subordinated to'-
given less weight than-race.92 69 Justice Ginsburg found that the
majority's holding also expanded the judiciary's role in the redistrict-
ing process, a highly politicized function normally controlled by the
states.27°
support[ed] the same candidate, and, . . . [that] the successful candidate ignore(d] the
interests of... white constituents." Id. at 2497 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
265. Id. at 2498 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30,
56-58 (1986) (interpreting § 2 to provide a remedy for voter dilution when the plaintiffs
allege and prove that racially gerrymandered district lines prevented them from electing
a candidate of their own race)). See supra notes 90-93 and accompanying text.
266. Miller, 115 S. Ct. at 2498 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens found
Miller distinguishable because in those cases, segregation, as well as racially
gerrymandered voting districts, "frustrated the public interest in diversity and tolerance
by barring African Americans from joining whites in the activities at issue." Id.
(Stevens, J., dissenting). Creating majority-minority districts, on the other hand,
"serves the [public] interest in diversity and tolerance by increasing the likelihood that
a meaningful number of black representatives will add their voices to legislative
debates." Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
267. Id. at 2499 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
268. Id. at 2499-500 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). Justices Stevens and Breyer joined
the entire opinion, while Justice Souter joined all but a portion of the opinion. Id. at
2499 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
269. Id. at 2499-500 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (quoting the majority opinion, id. at
2488).
270. Id. at 2499 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
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Justice Ginsburg began her dissent by noting several issues on
which the Court unanimously agreed: first, that the principles of fed-
eralism and separation of powers justify granting deference to a state
legislature's creation of a redistricting plan;27' second, that the coun-
try's history of discrimination against black citizens requires statutory
and constitutional protection of minority voting rights; 272 third, that
states may consider the racial or ethnic makeup of communities when
drawing district lines;273 and fourth, that states may group people ac-
cording to their common interests.2 7' Therefore, Justice Ginsburg rea-
soned, in order to violate the Equal Protection Clause, the Georgia
legislature "had to do more than [just] consider race." 275 Justice
Ginsburg determined that the issue dividing the Court was defining
"how much more" the State had to do.276
Justice Ginsburg emphasized the extreme deference with which
courts have traditionally treated redistricting plans.277 She explained
that extensive, blatant discrimination against black citizens in Georgia
and elsewhere in this country caused the courts to move away from
this deferential standard in cases where the plaintiffs alleged and
proved racial discrimination in the voting booth.278 She noted that the
271. Id. at 2500 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (quoting Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533,
586 (1964), for the notion that "legislative reapportionment is primarily a matter for
legislative consideration and determination").
272. Id. (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). Justice Ginsburg noted that the Voting Rights
Act and the Equal Protection Clause were designed to remedy past discriminatory acts and
prevent future racist acts from occurring. Id. (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (citations
omitted).
273. Id. (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
274. Id. (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). States may consider race, even if they are not
required to do so, in order to recognize that members of a community share common
interests and beliefs. Id. (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (citing Shaw 1, 113 S. Ct. at 2826).
Indeed, Justice Ginsburg argued that states could consider the race and ethnicity of voters
even when those voters do not necessarily share political, social, and economic
interests. Id. at 2504-05 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). She noted that "ethnicity itself can
tie people together." Id. (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (citing the many districts in this
country that are "identified by their ethnic character").
275. Id. at 2500 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
276. id. (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
277. Id. (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (citing Chapman v. Meier, 420 U.S. 1, 27 (1975)
(stating "what has been said on many occasions" is that legislative redistricting should
be primarily the duty "of the state through its legislature" rather than the courts)).
Additionally, Justice Ginsburg noted that the Constitution assigned the responsibility
of redistricting to the states. Id. (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); See U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 2.
278. Miller, 115 S. Ct. at 2500-01 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). Justice Ginsburg
detailed the history of discriminatory acts conducted against black citizens in Georgia
after the Fifteenth Amendment granted them the right to vote. Id. at 2501 (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting). For instance, at Georgia's constitutional convention in 1877, the
convention leader stated that the purpose of the convention was to ensure that blacks
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judiciary assumed an even greater role under the Voting Rights Act,
which Congress enacted in response to these discriminatory practices
by states.279
Justice Ginsburg also outlined the factual differences in Miller and
Shaw I, and how both cases reached the identical outcome. In Shaw
I, the Court noted that judicial intervention in redistricting plans should
occur only in extreme circumstances. 280 That intervention was jus-
tified in Shaw I because the State legislature drew the contested district
in such a bizarre manner that the legislature clearly considered only
race, while excluding all other traditional districting practices.28' In
contrast, Justice Ginsburg noted that the shape of the Eleventh District
in Miller did not evidence a legislative intent to consider race in the
absence of all other districting principles.28 2 Unlike the Shaw I
district, the Eleventh District was not bizarrely shaped.283 Therefore,
Justice Ginsburg concluded that the shape of the Eleventh District
should not justify judicial intervention. 2 4
Last, Justice Ginsburg criticized the majority for encouraging the
filing of equal protection claims against states "whenever plaintiffs
plausibly allege that other factors carried less weight than race. 285
She noted the general rule in Equal Protection cases, as the majority
pointed out: states must treat people as individuals and cannot classify
individuals on the basis of their commonality with certain groups.286
would "never be heard from." Id. (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (citations omitted). The
State later enacted a poll tax, created white primaries, and imposed literacy and other
requirements on those who wished to vote. Id. (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (citations
omitted). These practices resulted in "an almost absolute exclusion of the Negro voice
in state and federal elections." Id. (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (citations omitted). See
supra notes 62-74 and accompanying text for a discussion of racist voting practices
created by other states in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.
279. Miller, 115 S. Ct. at 2501 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (outlining the purpose and
scope of the Voting Rights Act). See supra notes 75-133 for a discussion of the Voting
Rights Act and the role of the judiciary under the Act. The Act "significantly reduced
voting discrimination against minorities." Miller, 115 S. Ct. at 2501 (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting).
280. Shaw 1, 113 S. Ct. at 2824. The Court stated that a redistricting plan would be
subject to strict scrutiny only if the contested district "is so extremely irregular on its
face," that the court must find the legislature intended to segregate voters by race. Id.
See supra part II.C.2 for a discussion of Shaw i.
281. Shaw 1, 113 S. Ct. at 2824.
282. Miller, 115 S. Ct. at 2502 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
283. Id. at 2502-03 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (explaining that the size, shape, and
formation of the Eleventh District generally conformed to other congressional districts
in the State).
284. Id. at 2504 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
285. Id. at 2505 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
286. Id. (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (quoting the majority opinion, id. at 2486, for the
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In contrast, Justice Ginsburg noted the exception to this rule in redis-
tricting cases, where states as a practical matter can, and must, divide
people into groups.287
Justice Ginsburg acknowledged the need for close judicial scrutiny
of previous redistricting cases, where states repeatedly discriminated
against minorities who possessed little political power needed to end
the discrimination.2 8 Contrarily, she argued that the majority racial
group does not require the protection of the courts, and that extensive
judicial interference in cases involving white citizens was therefore
unwarranted.289 Justice Ginsburg stated that by offering such protec-
tions, the majority needlessly expanded the judiciary's role in the re-
districting process. 9° In addition, she noted that the limits placed on
states' consideration of race prevented states from complying with
"[s]tatutory mandates and political realities [which] require states to
consider race." 29'
IV. ANALYSIS
The Court in Miller expanded its previous decision in Shaw I by
proposition that "'the simple command [at the heart of the Constitution's guarantee of
equal protection] is that the Government must treat citizens as individuals, not as simply
components of a racial, religious, sexual or national class"' (quoting Metro
Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 602 (1990) (O'Connor, J., dissenting)
(citations omitted)) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
287. Id. at 2506 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). Justice Ginsburg distinguished the two
situations by stressing that in other contexts, such as employment, states must consider
individual characteristics such as merit and achievement, and cannot consider race or
ethnicity. Id. (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). In redistricting, however, states may
constitutionally consider the race and ethnicity of individuals, as well as other
identifying characteristics, when drawing district lines. Id. (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
288. Id. (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (noting that the "equal protection rights of
minority voters thus could have remained unrealized absent the Judiciary's close
surveillance").
289. Id. (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). Justice Ginsburg added that since white citizens
constituted a majority in the State, they could exert sufficient political pressure to
prevent the State from enacting a discriminatory redistricting plan. Id. (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting). In addition, the State could also influence the Justice Department to
approve the plan, because as an arm of the federal government, it was also sensitive to
political pressure. Id. (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). Furthermore, Justice Ginsburg noted,
if the Justice Department refused to preclear the plan, the white majority could pressure
the State to request judicial review of the plan. Id. (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). Last, she
stated, the white majority also possesses the political power to request that the Voting
Rights Act, "itself a political measure," be altered. Id. (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
290. Id. at 2507 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
291. Id. (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). Justice Ginsburg expressed hope that future
decisions would resolve this conflict by finding that states may properly consider race.
Id. (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
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allowing white citizens2 to challenge legislative redistricting plans not
only when legislatures create bizarre-shaped majority-minority dis-
tricts, but also when race is a predominant motive in creating such dis-
tricts. 293  The Court noted that such "segregated" districts, 294 unlike
other equal protection violations, cause harm to the plaintiffs because
they reinforce racial stereotypes and "may balkanize us into competing
racial factions.",29 In so holding, the Miller Court departed from thirty
years of decisions that encouraged a broad reading of the Voting
Rights Act and supported the Act's purpose of increasing minority vot-
296ing power.
A. The Status of Key Issues After Miller
1. Issues Resolved by Miller
In Miller v. Johnson, the Court articulated the necessary elements of
an equal protection claim for racial gerrymandering.297 While the
Court previously held in Shaw I that a redistricting plan will be subject
to strict scrutiny if it is "bizarre on its face, 298 the Court in Miller
stated that other factors besides bizarreness could also trigger strict
299
scrutiny.
292. The plaintiffs in both Shaw H1 and Miller were white. Miller, 115 S. Ct. at
2485; Shaw II, 861 F. Supp. at 416.
293. Miller, 115 S. Ct. at 2486.
294. Id. It is interesting to note, in light of the use of the term "segregation," that in
most majority-minority districts African Americans make up less than 65% of the total
population, and non-minorities constitute the rest of the population. See, e.g., Hays 1,
839 F. Supp. at 1207-08 (indicating that is it unnecessary for the legislature to include
so many minorities in one district where they constitute 63% of population). These may
actually be the most integrated districts in the country. See generally Aleinikoff &
Issacharoff, supra note 11, at 611-12 which explains:
Labeling the North Carolina districting as 'political apartheid' is a disturbing
exaggeration that hinders the Court's analysis in several ways . . . . Thus,
while some of the districts were undoubtedly drawn in order to guarantee that
African Americans would constitute a majority, it is difficult to justify the
hyperbolic labels the, Court applied.
Id.; Gayle Pollard Terry, Deval Patrick, The Justice Department's Leading Civil Rights
Advocate, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 16, 1994, at M3 (quoting Patrick' as asserting that racially
gerrymandered districts "are responsible for the most integrated Congress in history").
295. Miller, 115 S. Ct. at 2486 (quoting Shaw 1, 113 S. Ct. at 2832).
296. For a discussion of these decisions, see supra notes 106-33 and accompanying
text.
297. See supra notes 215-53 and accompanying text for a discussion of these
elements.
298. Miller, 115 S. Ct at 2486 (citing Shaw 1. 113 S. Ct. at 2816). See supra note
124 and accompanying text.
299. Miller, 115 S. Ct. at 2486. See supra notes 221-22 and accompanying text.
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In order to establish a Miller claim, the Court stated, a plaintiff must
prove that race played a predominant role in the redistricting pro-
cess."° A plaintiff can meet this burden in either of two ways: first,
by direct evidence that the legislature created a district for the purpose
of ensuring that the majority of its residents belonged to a specific
race;3 or second, by circumstantial evidence showing that since a
majority-minority district is so bizarrely shaped, the legislature must
have intended to ensure that a majority of its residents were minori-
ties.3° 2
Once the plaintiff proves racial gerrymandering, the redistricting
plan will be subject to strict scrutiny by the court.30 3 In applying the
equal protection analysis, the Miller Court stated that the plan could
survive strict scrutiny only if it was "narrowly tailored to achieve a
compelling [governmental] interest. ' ' 3' 4 The Court found that one
compelling interest would be to eradicate the-effects of past discrimi-
nation.305 The Court suggested that compliance with the Voting Rights
Act, in combination with the interest in remedying past discrimination,
might also prove a compelling justification.
If the state suggests a legitimate compelling interest, a court must
then determine if the plan is narrowly tailored to achieve that inter-
est.30 7 In order to satisfy this prong, the state must offer specific
300. Miller, 115 S. Ct. at 2488. While legislatures may still consider race, as well
other factors, when drawing district lines, the Court will closely examine any plan where
race predominated among those factors. Id.
301. Id. For instance, in Miller, the plaintiffs introduced at trial testimony of State
officials who said they created the Eleventh District to comply with Justice Department
requirements that they create a third majority-minority district. Id. at 2489. The
plaintiffs also introduced letters from the Justice Department insisting upon a third
majority-minority district. Id. The Miller court held that this evidence justified the
lower court's finding that the plaintiffs proved racial gerrymandering, thus subjecting
the plan to strict scrutiny. Id. See supra notes 235-38 and accompanying text.
302. Miller, 115 S. Ct. at 2488. The shape must be considered in relation to the
racial and population configurations within the district. Id. at 2489. If portions of the
district extend in odd directions, just barely including black neighborhoods, then the
Court can infer that the legislature included these neighborhoods in an effort to create a
majority-black district. See id. at 2484 (explaining the shape and demographics of the
Eleventh District), 2489 (stating that evidence of the District's shape, "considered in
conjunction with its racial and population densities ... is quite compelling," but noting
that direct evidence already established racial gerrymandering).
303. Id. at 2490.
304. Id. (citations omitted).
305. Id.
306. Id. at 2490-91. The Court declined to address whether the Voting Rights Act,
standing alone, would provide a compelling interest. Id. at 2491; see infra notes 344-48
and accompanying text.
307. Miller, 115 S. Ct. at 2490.
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evidence of past racial discrimination, and must provide enough evi-
dence to establish a strong basis that the plan is reasonably necessary
to remedy that discrimination.'38
2. Issues Not Resolved by Miller
While the Court expanded and clarified the elements of an equal
protection claim for racial gerrymandering, the Miller decision failed to
address important issues that lower courts will have to decide when
examining future racial gerrymandering cases. For instance, the Miller
Court did not provide any conclusive guidelines for determining how
to prove racial gerrymandering in such cases. 3' The Miller Court held
that a plaintiff can make out a prima facie case of an equal protection
violation by showing that race was the "predominant factor" when the
legislature enacted a redistricting plan.310 In Miller, the plaintiffs could
easily prove this element in light of extensive evidence that the State of
Georgia created the Eleventh District solely to satisfy the Justice
Department's requirement of three majority-black districts. 31' Race
therefore clearly predominated over other factors when creating the
district.3t 2 In most cases, however, the legislature considers several
factors, many of them political, when drawing the lines which will
make it more difficult for courts to determine in future cases whether
race predominates.1 3
In addition, the Court avoided clarifying the relationship between
the Voting Rights Act and the Equal Protection Clause. Congress
created the Act to eradicate continued discrimination against minority
groups in the voting process, and to ensure that minorities were not
308. Id. at 2491.
309. Redistricting: Into the Thicket, SACRAMENTO BEE, July 1, 1995, at B6. "[T]he
decision's deeper problem is the confusion and turmoil [it] may generate. Determining
what a shrewd political leader uses as a 'predominant' factor may not be as easy as
making judicial pronouncements." Id.
See also Linda Greenhouse, The Supreme Court: Congressional Districts, Justices, in
5-4 Vote, Reject Districts Drawn With Race the 'Predominant Factor'; New Voting
Rules, N. Y. TIMES, June 30, 1995, at Al (finding that "[almong the most pressing
questions is how the lower courts are to decide when race has been the 'predominant'
factor as opposed to one factor among others in the ethnic, geographic and partisan stew
of electoral politics.").
310. Miller, 115 S. Ct. at 2487-88. See supra note 233 and accompanying text.
311. Miller, 115 S. Ct. at 2484. The Justice Department refused to preclear the plan
until the State created a third majority-minority district. Id. The State then redrew the
lines of the Eleventh District so that more than 50% of eligible voters would be black.
Id. See supra notes 190-95 and accompanying text.
312. Miller, 115 S. Ct. at 2488.
313. See infra notes 367-76 and accompanying text.
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denied their constitutional right to vote.3 4 Since the Voting Rights Act
became enforceable, minority citizens have seen dramatic increases in
their voting power,3 5 but in light of continued acts of discrimination,
the need to enforce the Act continues.3 6 States create majority-
minority districts to satisfy sections 2 and 5 of the Act, which require
that the legislature consider minority voters when drawing district
lines.33 7 When minorities predominate a district, however, considera-
tions of minorities when mapping voting districts are now considered
prima facie unconstitutional.3 8 It remains unclear how states can
comply with these laws and avoid violating the Equal Protection
Clause, as race will almost always predominate because of states'
good faith efforts to comply with federal laws.3t 9
The Miller Court sidestepped this issue by determining that since the
State's actions were unnecessary to satisfy the Act, the State could not
rely on the Act as a defense to an equal protection claim. 320 In
addition, the Court implied that the Act, "standing alone," might not be
a sufficiently compelling justification for racial gerrymandering.3 21
The Court acknowledged, however, that conflicting interpretations of
the Act could bring it "into tension with the Fourteenth Amend-
314. See, e.g., South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 315 (1966) ("The
Voting Rights Act of 1965 reflects Congress' firm intention to rid the country of racial
discrimination in voting."). See supra part ll.B.
315. See Grofman, supra note 77, at 1247.
316. See Prepared Testimony of Deval L. Patrick, Assistant Attorney General, Civil
Rights Division, Department of Justice, Before the Committee on the Judiciary,
Subcommittee on the Constitution, U.S. House of Representatives, FEDERAL NEWS
SERVICE, July 20, 1995 (citing examples of blatant racial discrimination in housing,
employment, and voting, as well as racist criminal acts committed against black and
Hispanic citizens, that the Department of Justice is prosecuting).
317. See supra notes 89-105 for a discussion of these requirements.
318. Miller, 115 S. Ct. at 2487. See supra note 220 and accompanying text.
3 19. A federal appellate court was faced with this issue in Bridgeport Coalition for
Fair Representation v. City of Bridgeport, 26 F.3d 271 (2d Cir. 1994). The court held
that Shaw I applied only when the redistricting plan on its face offered convincing
evidence that its creators used race as the sole motivation in designing the plan. Id. at
278. In Bridgeport, minority rights advocates sought both a preliminary and permanent
injunction against city council elections under a redistricting plan because it diluted
minority voting strength in violation of the Voting Rights Act. Id. at 27-73. On
appeal, the city argued that an alternative plan recommended by the plaintiffs violated
the principles enunciated in Shaw 1. Id. at 278. The court in Bridgeport, attempting to
reconcile the different standards involved in voter dilution and Shaw I claims,
emphasized that a governmental unit must consider racial factors when creating voting
districts in order to increase minority voting strength. Id. Therefore, the court
explained, the plan will not violate the Equal Protection Clause unless the racial makeup
of the districts serves as 'the sole criteria. Id.
320. Miller, 115 S. Ct. at 2492.
321. ld. at 2491.
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ment. ''322 Such a pronouncement threatens the future of the Voting
Rights Act.
32 3
Finally, the Miller Court did not address whether a plaintiff can
prove racial gerrymandering of a congressional district when the
district is not bizarrely shaped. In both Miller and Shaw I, the Court
concluded that the districts had been drawn in a bizarre manner.324 In
Miller, the Court found that the bizarre shape of the district and its
demographics, along with other evidence of legislative intent, estab-
•lished a primafacie case of racial discrimination. 32 The Court did not
state, however, whether a court could find racial gerrymandering when
the majority-minority district is not bizarrely shaped.
B. Legal Correctness of Miller
The Miller decision reflects the current trend of the Court, which
continues to move away from applying a deferential standard when
examining remedial, race-based legislation.326 In recent decisions, for
example, the Court has consistently expressed the opinion that any
race-based policy would be strictly scrutinized, regardless of which
governmental unit created it.3"7
By extending the strict scrutiny standard to congressional redistrict-
ing plans whenever those plans contain racially gerrymandered dis-
tricts, both the Miller and Shaw I decisions ignore several important
factors. First, most congressional districts in this country can be
322. Id. at 2493.
323. Aleinikoff & Issacharoff, supra note 11, at 639 (noting that if federal decisions
interpreting Shaw I "condemn remedial race-conscious districting as constitutionally
impermissible essentialism," they weaken "core principles of voting rights law
developed through almost three decades of litigation").
324. See Miller, 115 S. Ct. at 2489; Shaw 1, 113 S. Ct. at 2820-21. But see Miller,
115 S. Ct. at 2502-04 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (noting that most of the districts in
Georgia are unusually shaped, and that the disputed district in Miller is not on the list of
the 28 most bizarre districts in the country).
325. Miller, 115 S. Ct. at 2489 (finding that "by comparison with other districts the
geometric shape of the Eleventh District may not seem bizarre on its face, . . . [but] in
conjunction with its racial and population densities, the story of racial gerrymandering
seen by the District Court becomes much clearer.").
326. See, e.g., Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 115 S. Ct. 2097, 2113 (1995)
(overruling Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547 (1990)) (concluding that
race-based actions by Congress must be strictly scrutinized under the Fifth Amendment,
just as similar actions by state and local governments are strictly scrutinized under the
Fourteenth Amendment); Shaw 1, 113 S. Ct. at 2824 (holding that redistricting plans
that classified citizens on the basis of race would be subject to strict scrutiny); City of
Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493-94 (1989) (explaining that the
appropriate standard of review of any race-based policy should be strict scrutiny).
327. Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2113-17.
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classified as bizarrely shaped districts.328 Second, legislators have
legally gerrymandered districts for many years and for many different
reasons.329 Such gerrymandering existed even before the first con-
gressional elections in our country.330
After Shaw I, however, citizens may now sue states under the Equal
Protection Clause for going too far in considering minority voting
power.33' When enacting redistricting legislation, states must consider
a wide variety of competing factors, including protection of incum-
bents, preservation of partisan interests, cohesion of communities, and
acknowledgment of minority voting power. 32 The Voting Rights Act
requires states to consider this last factor when redistricting. 333 The
Shaw I decision, however, places states in a precarious situation:
states must acknowledge and encourage minority voting strength to
satisfy the Voting Rights Act, but in doing so, they run the risk of vio-
lating the Equal Protection Clause.
In comparing redistricting plans to other equal protection issues,
Miller also ignores other important points. Historically, courts treated
voting rights issues much differently from other equal protection
issues. 334  Not only are voting rights fundamental, they are also
328. Terry, supra note 294, at M3. "[T]he notion that these districts are bizarre
shapes makes no sense when you take a look at congressional districts across the
country and realize that there is no such thing as a regular or normal shape." Id.
329. Id. "Gerrymandering is traditional. Gerrymandering is done for a whole variety
of things-some of which the [C]ourt has said is explicitly appropriate." Id. See also
Aleinikoff & Issacharoff, supra note 11, at 607 ("Redistricting is an area in which
classifications of all kinds-most notably partisan, socioeconomic, racial, and
ethnic-are the lifeblood of the process.").
330. See supra note II and accompanying text.
331. Shaw l, 113 S. Ct. at 2832.
332. The Supreme Court has upheld each of these factors as a valid element to
consider in redistricting. See, e.g., Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 138-39 (1986)
(White, J., with three Justices concurring) (explaining that the intentional drawing of
district boundaries for partisan ends and for no other reason does not, in and of itself,
violate the Equal Protection Clause); Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S. 725, 740 (1983)
(holding that avoiding contests between incumbents and preserving the cores of prior
districts are valid legislative policies in redistricting plans).
333. 42 U.S.C. § 1973.
334. Grofman, supra note 77, at 1244-47. Grofman found at least five important
differences between voting rights and other Fourteenth Amendment rights: voting has a
special status as a fundamental right; most voting rights are also protected by the
comprehensive Voting Rights Act; "the nature of voting rights remedies is [said] to be
more straightforward than in other areas of racial discrimination"; in voting rights
cases, the nature of the remedy is usually directed solely to those who have already been
injured, and is capable of "immediate implementation;" and finally, the nature of the
remedy for voter dilution in particular "does not require injury to innocent parties." Id.
at 1244-46.
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invaluable in a truly democratic political system. 335 Additionally, the
Miller Court failed to recognize that unlike in other equal protection
contexts, the maximization of minority voting strength in redistricting
cases does not unfairly diminish the voting power of non-minorities.
In other equal protection contexts, the use of preferential treatment for
minorities caused non-minorities to be disadvantaged.336 Congress
intended the Voting Rights Act, however, not to give one racial group
an advantage over another, but instead to ensure that all citizens have
an equal say in government through the voting process.337 As a result,
redistricting legislation that reflects considerations of race does not
give one group more voting power than it deserves; rather, it attempts
to equalize voting power among all groups.338
The Miller decision also allows for increased judicial intervention in
legislative redistricting plans.339 Such interference poses serious dan-
gers because unelected officials will decide essentially political issues.
In previous cases, the Supreme Court recognized the importance of
granting deference to state legislatures in the area of redistricting." °
335. Id. at 1244. See generally Aleinikof & Issacharoff, supra note II, at 600
(comparing the problem of identifying voting rights under both the Voting Rights Act
and the Fourteenth Amendment).
336. See, e.g., City of Richmond v. J. A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989). In
Croson, the intentional use of minority contractors prevented other contractors from
competing for projects. Id.
337. See, e.g., South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 308-37 (1966)
(affirming the constitutionality of the Voting Rights Act after discussing the history of
repeated discrimination against African Americans, and the use of voting procedures
designed specifically to prevent minorities from exercising their right to vote;
discussing in detail the legislative history of the Act); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533,
561, 568-69 (1964) (striking down a state legislative redistricting plan for violating
the Equal Protection Clause; holding that states are required to permit all citizens to have
equal voting power by placing them in equivalently populated districts).
338. While proportional representation by racial group is not required by the Voting
Rights Act, the Supreme Court in Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30 (1986), stated that
lack of proportionality could constitute evidence of a violation of the Voting Rights
Act. Id. at 42. See also Miller, 115 S. Ct. at 2497 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing
that plaintiffs lack standing to bring a racial gerrymandering claim because they suffered
no legally cognizable injury, and that if they did, they could bring a Gingles claim for
voter dilution). See supra notes 259-67 and accompanying text.
339. In Hays I, for instance, after the court rejected a second redistricting plan, the
court drew its own map for the 1994 elections. 862 F. Supp. at 128. Other courts
threatened to do the same. See, e.g., Johnson v. Miller, 864 F. Supp. 1354, 1393 (S.D.
Ga. 1994), aff'd, 115 S. Ct. 2475 (1995).
340. See, e.g., Voinovich v. Quiltner, 113 S. Ct. 1149, 1156 (1993) ("Federal courts
are barred from intervening in state apportionment in the absence of a violation of
federal law precisely because it is the domain of the States, and not the federal courts, to
conduct apportionment in the first place."); Growe v. Emison, 113 S. Ct. 1075, 1080-
81 (1993). See also Johnson, 864 F. Supp. at 1394 (Edmondson, J., dissenting)
(explaining that redistricting is "fundamentally the domain of the states" since "state
1995]
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Prior to passage of the Voting Rights Act, there was a need for
judicial intervention in voting rights cases. Legislative inaction on im-
portant societal issues forced the courts to become involved in order to
protect extremely important constitutional rights. 34' Additionally, acts
by the legislatures themselves violated the Constitution, and the
judiciary offered some protection to citizens by reviewing these acts to
determine if a violation existed.342 Indeed, in the voting rights arena,
early decisions by the Court led to the reduction of legislative actions
that invidiously discriminated against minorities.343
Since the passage of the Voting Rights Act, however, the federal
government has ensured that state legislatures recognize minority
voting rights.344 Elected representatives in state legislatures can create
redistricting plans only after extensive research and public debate
before they may submit those plans to the Department of Justice for
approval.345 In addition, section 5 of the Act grants the Department of
Justice broad powers to review the redistricting plans of states that
historically used discriminatory voting mechanisms to deprive minor-
ities of their voting rights.346 The Supreme Court has previously up-
held the grant of such broad powers as constitutional.3 47 Thus, the
Voting Rights Act, and its accompanying federal regulations, contain
numerous safeguards that protect against violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment's Equal Protection Clause.34s
political processess pervade the . . . process").
341. See generally Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973) (granting women a
fundamental right to privacy in abortion issues); Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483,
493 (1954) (striking down segregation of races in public schools).
342. See, e.g., Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 209 (1962) (establishing justiciability
of voting rights claims under the Fourteenth Amendment); Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S.
(1 Cranch 137) (1803) (subjecting congressional acts to judicial review).
343. See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 569 (1964) (voting districts with
substantially unequal number of constituents held to violate Equal Protection Clause of
Fourteenth Amendment); Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339, 340 (1960) (finding a
redrawn city map unconstitutional); Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649, 664-66 (1944)
(ruling white primaries unconstitutional); Guinn v. United States, 238 U.S. 347, 367
(1915) (invalidating grandfather clauses).
344. See supra notes 75-88 and accompanying text.
345. See Johnson, 864 F. Supp. at 1354; Shaw I1, 861 F. Supp. at 408; Vera v.
Richards, 861 F. Supp. 1304 (S.D. Tex. 1994); Hays 1, 839 F. Supp. at 1188. In each of
these cases, the court noted the months spent researching and debating the issue, with
input from many citizens of the state.
346. 42 U.S.C. § 1973(c) (1988).
347. Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S. 544, 565-69 (1969) (upholding broad
use of federal power under § 5).
348. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973 to 1973gg-10 (1988 & Supp. V 1994); see also 28
C.F.R. §§ 51.1-51.67 (1993).
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Finally, federal courts have struck down majority-minority districts
based on their bizarre shape, but approved other districts with equally
strange shapes in which whites were the majority.349 These decisions
suggest that the Equal Protection Clause has been applied inconsis-
tently by the Courts, resulting in unfair treatment of majority-minority
districts.350
V. IMPACT
The Supreme Court's decision in Miller351 could have a dramatic
impact on congressional districts nationwide.352 The Miller decision
may well result in the unseating of many current minority members of
Congress.35 3 Since many states created majority-minority districts for
the purpose of increasing minority representation, all of those districts
could potentially be held to violate the Equal Protection Clause unless
the state can offer a compelling reason for its actions.354 The Miller
349. See generally Johnson, 864 F. Supp. at 1395-97 (Edmondson, J., dissenting)
(stating that the majority-minority district which the court struck down is no less
bizarrely shaped, nor no less contiguous, than some other districts in the State). See
also William Raspberry, A Court Decision That Could Send Black Politicians Packing,
CHI. TRIB., November 1, 1994, § I, at 23. Raspberry compared two equally bizarre
Texas districts, one of which is 47% black and the other of which is 80% white. Id. The
black district was declared unconstitutional, but the white district was not found
unconstitutional. Vera, 861 F. Supp. at 1334, 1344-45. Raspberry quoted an NAACP
attorney, who is involved in the Texas redistricting litigation, as noting that
"bizarreness becomes a constitutional issue only when it applies to districts with a
substantial black population, while white districts that are at least as funny-looking are
allowed to stand." Raspberry, supra.
350. See, e.g., Penda Hair, Racial Districts; This is the Way to Overcome Results of
Gerrymandering, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, September II, 1994, at 6J ("[Dlistricts
designed to remedy centuries of racial exclusion are being required to meet much higher
standards.").
351. See supra notes 212-53 and accompanying text.
352. Jan Crawford Greenburg, Race-based Districts Banned; Vote Power of Blacks
Jeopardized, CHI. TRIB., June 30, 1995, § I, at I (noting that the Court's ruling could
"dramatically reduce the number of minorities in Congress ... to merely a handful").
353. David G. Savage, Minority-Based Gerrymandering Facing Backlash, L.A. TIMES,
October 8, 1994, at Al (noting that in 1992, thirty-nine African Americans were elected
to the House of Representatives, a "historic high water mark," and that recent federal
redistricting decisions could prevent many of these men and women from being
reelected).
354. See Miller, 115 S. Ct. at 2498 (stating that to satisfy strict scrutiny standard a
state must provide evidence of compelling reason for districting legislation); see also
Greenburg, supra note 352, § 1, at 13 (noting that while the Court held only a
compelling state interest can justify a district drawn primarily on the basis of race, what
such a compelling reason may be was left uncertain). See supra text accompanying
notes 222-43. But see Miller, 115 S. Ct. at 2497 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (stating
"the Court's standard does not throw into doubt the vast majority of the Nation's 435
Congressional Districts .... ").
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decision thus sets the stage for a flurry of lawsuits by citizens around
the country who wish to challenge the constitutionality of the
districts.355
The split among the Justices in Miller, however, reveals that the
issue of racial gerrymandering has yet to be conclusively decided. The
majority opinion expressed the view that any time race plays a pre-
dominant role in the redistricting process, the resulting redistricting
plan will be considered prima facie unconstitutional.356 Four dissent-
ing Justices disagreed, arguing that courts should apply a more defer-
ential standard when examining redistricting plans.357
Justice O'Connor cast the deciding fifth vote that created the ma-
jority in Miller. She expressed reluctance in following the majority's
broad holding, stating in her concurring opinion that redistricting plans
should be strictly scrutinized only in "extreme instances., 35 8 Addi-
tionally, Justice O'Connor found that the standard of proof enunciated
by the majority would be a "demanding one" for plaintiffs to meet.359
Moreover, Justice O'Connor's fact-specific opinions in Shaw 1360
and Miller36' repeatedly emphasized her reluctance to interfere in state
political processes, as well as her belief that such interference was
justified in both cases. In Shaw I, Justice O'Connor based her deci-
sion regarding the unconstitutionality of the North Carolina district on
its extraordinarily odd shape, and suggested that the legislature simply
went too far in trying to create a majority-minority district.362 In
Miller, she similarly found that the Justice Department went too far in
forcing the State of Georgia to comply with its demands for a third
majority-minority district.363 Thus, Justice O'Connor's opinion in
Miller suggests that in future cases with less "extreme" facts, she
might find the majority-minority districts at issue to satisfy the require-
ments of the Equal Protection Clause. As a result, Justice O'Connor
could form a new majority with the dissenters in Miller.3"
355. See Greenburg, supra note 352, § 1, at 13 (quoting professor of law Daniel
Polsby (stating that many cases will surface before racial classifications completely
disappear)).
356. Miller, 115 S. Ct. at 2487. See supra text accompanying notes 233-38.
357. Miller, 115 S. Ct. at 2500 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
358. Id. at 2497 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
359. Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring).
360. See supra part ll.C.2.
361. See supra part II.A.3.
362. Shaw 1, 113 S. Ct. at 2824-27. See supra part II.C.2 for a discussion of the
Shaw I opinion.
363. Miller, 115 S. Ct. at 2497 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
364. See Linda Greenhouse, On Voting Rights, Court Faces a Tangled Web, N.Y.
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The Court gave itself the opportunity to limit Miller to only
"extreme" cases when, on the same day it decided Miller, the Court
also decided Dewitt v. Wilson.365 In an unsigned decision, the Court
upheld the California legislative redistricting plan, even though the
State considered race when creating the plan.3 6
Significantly, the Court has also decided to hear two other redis-
tricting cases, Bush v. Vera367 and Shaw v. Hunt.368 Those cases will
force the Court to address several issues it avoided in the Miller case.
The Bush case in Texas, for instance, can be distinguished from Miller
in two respects. First, the majority-minority districts are "relatively
compact" and are not bizarrely shaped; in fact, they encompass defined
minority communities.369 In addition, the State of Texas plans to
argue that race did not play as important a role in the legislative redis-
tricting process as incumbency protection.3 71
In Bush, the Court will therefore have to clarify its decision in
Miller in two respects: first, whether majority-minority districts must
be geographically compact in order to withstand judicial scrutiny; and
second, whether protecting incumbents is an additional permissible
factor for states to consider when creating these districts. 37' The Court
has never addressed either issue; its decision in that case could there-
fore provoke dramatic changes in the redistricting process.372
TIMES, July 14, 1995, at AI, A8. "[Justice] O'Connor votes with the majority but writes
a concurring opinion that basically agrees with the dissent. She hasn't made up her
mind yet." Id. (quoting law professor Eric Schnapper, in an unidentified interview).
365. 115 S. Ct. 2637 (1995) (mem).
366. Id. The Court did not explain its order, stating only that "[wlith respect to
questions I through 4 presented by the statement as to jurisdiction, the judgment is
affirmed. With respect to questions 5 and 6, the appeal is dismissed." Id. See supra
notes 150-52 for a discussion of the district court's opinion in this case. See Linda
Greenhouse, Minority Electoral Gains in Peril, N.Y. TIMES, June 30, 1995, at Al
(stating that the Supreme Court's affirmance in DeWitt suggests that "race may continue
to play a role in redistricting.").
367. 115 S. Ct. 2639 (1995). For a discussion of the prior history of Bush, see supra
notes 159-61 which discuss Vera v. Richards, 861 F. Supp. 1304 (S.D. Tex. 1994).
368. 115 S. Ct. 2639 (1995). For a discussion of the prior history of this case see
supra notes 122-33 and accompanying text which discuss Shaw 1, 113 S. Ct. at 2816,
and also see supra notes 147-49 and accompanying text which discuss Shaw I1, 861 F.
Supp. at 408.
369. Greenhouse, supra note 364, at Al.
370. Jane Ely, Gerrymandering to Protect Incumbents, HOUSTON CHRONICLE, July 9,
1995, at B2 (discussing the fear of incumbents that the Court will invalidate incumbency
protection as a factor when enacting redistricting plans).
371. Id.
372. Id. Ely notes that states have always presumed that they could consider
incumbency protection when drawing the boundaries of voting districts, but that the
Court has never before directly addressed the issue. Id. See supra part IV.A.2 for a
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The Hunt case will also provide additional issues for the Court to
address. In previous decisions, the Court avoided deciding whether a
state's attempted compliance with the Voting Rights Act could be a
sufficiently compelling justification for considering race in the redis-
tricting process, or even whether the Act, as applied, was consti-
tutional.373 In Miller, however, the Court acknowledged that a state's
consideration of race in an effort to comply with the Voting Rights Act
could create a potential conflict between the Act and the Equal Pro-
tection Clause.374 In Hunt, the Court will have to consider the rela-
tionship between the two,375 as the lower court upheld a redistricting
plan because the State properly attempted to comply with the Act.
376
VI. CONCLUSION
In Miller, the Court clarified a few questions created by the Shaw I
decision, but neglected to answer other, more disturbing questions.
The Court resolved that a plaintiff can prove racial gerrymandering by
evidence other than, or in addition to, the existence of a bizarrely-
shaped district. The Court did not address, however, how much evi-
dence is needed to prove racial gerrymandering, or whether racial
gerrymandering can ever survive strict scrutiny. By agreeing to decide
the constitutionality of other redistricting plans in the next term, the
Court has given itself the opportunity to settle the most difficult, and
divisive, issues in voting rights jurisprudence.
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discussion of the current confusion regarding the importance of bizarre shapes in the
Court's analysis of the constitutionality of redistricting plans.
373. See supra notes 135-61 and accompanying text.
374. Miller, 115 S. Ct. at 2493.
375. See Greenhouse, supra note 364, at A8 (stating that the Court will be required to
confront "another issue it avoided in the Georgia case: the relationship between the
Voting Rights Act and the Constitution").
376. See supra notes 167-71 and accompanying text for a discussion of the lower
court's holding.
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